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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
KIM WAS KOREA AND KOREA WAS KIM: THE FORMATION OF JUCHE
IDEOLOGY AND PERSONALITY CULT IN NORTH KOREA
by
Bianca Trifoi
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor
Juche ideology, created by founder Kim Il-Sung, governs all aspects of North
Korean society. This thesis attempts to answer the questions of why and how Juche
ideology and the cult of personality surrounding Kim Il-Sung were successfully
implemented in North Korea. It is a historical analysis of the formation of the North
Korean state that considers developments from the late 19th century to the late 20th
century, with particular attention paid to the 1950s-1970s and to Kim’s own writings and
speeches. The thesis argues that Juche was successfully implemented and
institutionalized in North Korea due to several factors, including the rise of Korean
nationalism, the personal history of Kim Il-Sung, the Korean War and resulting domestic
strife, and the influence of the international socialist movement. It provides a historical
explanation of Juche and its importance within North Korea, which in turn is necessary
for understanding North Korea as a whole.
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Section I: Introduction
Despite being categorized as a Communist state, North Korea has functioned under the
ideology of Juche, or self-reliance, since founder Kim Il-Sung first formally introduced
the idea in a speech in 1955. Juche was, at its inception, an attempt to apply tenets of
Maoist, Stalinist, and Marxist-Leninist thought to the particular cause of the Korean
socialist revolution in combination with Korean nationalism. By the time Juche was
officially inserted into the North Korean Constitution in 1972, it had become the means
of justifying Kim Il-Sung's authoritarian rule and cult of personality in all aspects of
North Korean society. The Kim personality cult went beyond a political dictatorship in
that it dominated the daily lives of every citizen in the state, oversaw every decision, and
came to resemble religious worship.
The primary purpose of this research is to examine how and why Juche and the
personality cult of Kim Il-Sung were successfully implemented in North Korea.
Specifically, it examines the internal and external influences on Juche ideology, including
the historical and international political contexts, the role of Confucianism and religion
within Korea, and Kim Il-Sung's own personal history and experiences. It considers the
various different arguments and approaches of researchers and authors and enhances the
overall scholarly discussion on Juche ideology and North Korea. Many of these works
approach the formation of Juche ideology from strictly one perspective. This thesis serves
to synthesize the aforementioned authors’ arguments into one comprehensive, coherent,
and multifaceted analysis of the different factors that contributed to the creation of the
Juche ideology. It also refers heavily to the writings and speeches of Kim Il-Sung himself
and of Kim Jong Il.
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The study is significant for understanding the history and ideology of North
Korea. Juche ideology has remained fundamentally unchanged since Kim Il-Sung first
implemented it as state ideology, so understanding Juche is necessary when considering
virtually all aspects of North Korean domestic and foreign policies since the Korean War.
This thesis is a historical study of the factors surrounding the formation of the North
Korean state, Kim Il-Sung's rise to power, and the implementation and institutionalization
of Juche ideology. It considers the context of the rise of Korean nationalism, especially in
the late 19th century and during Japanese colonial rule in the early 20th century. It also
considers the international political context of the mid-20th century, especially the
aftermath of the Korean War, and relations between the socialist states.
Countless works on North Korea and its history exist, detailing a broad range of
topics and approaches. Martin (2004), Lintner (2005), and French (2005) provide some of
the more comprehensive works on North Korea, though their works focus on explaining
all aspects of contemporary North Korea. While their works are incredibly informative,
their references to Juche and the early years of North Korea are limited to building an
understanding of contemporary North Korean society.
The majority of other works on North Korea, its history, and its ideology focus on
one particular aspect, be it Korean nationalism, Confucianism, or relations with other
socialist states. Robinson and Robinson (1986) and Armstrong (2003) argue that the
decline of the Joseon dynasty in the late 19th century set the scene for the rise of Korean
nationalism. Robinson (1988), Helgesen (1991), Kihl (1994), Seth (2011), Kim (2012),
and

(2013) all emphasize the role of Japanese colonial rule of Korea from 1910-1945

in breeding a strong sense of Korean nationalism and drawing revolutionary guerrilla

2

fighters to Communist thought. This thesis builds upon their arguments by comparing
one example of early nationalistic Korean writings with the speeches of Kim Il-Sung on
Juche. Lankov (2002) and Szalontai (2005) have provided in-depth accounts of SovietNorth Korean relations. Their work reveals that, with the death of Stalin in 1953,
international Communism lacked a strong central figure for Kim to follow. The Soviet
process of de-Stalinization beginning in 1956 further distanced Kim Il-Sung from full
adoption of a Stalinist model of socialism in North Korea (Lankov 2002).
This study also considers the indigenous or cultural aspects of Juche
ideology. Lim (1982) and Belke (1999) attempt to analyze the religious aspects of Juche
from a Christian perspective, but fall short of drawing direct parallels between Juche and
Christianity. This thesis builds upon their work and compares texts on Juche to Bible
verses and other Christian texts to highlight their similarities. Helgesen (1991), Kihl
(1994), Medlicott (2005), Kang (2011), David-West (2011), Aguirre (2014), and Kim
(2014) argue that Juche absorbed many of the characteristics of Joseon Korea (13921897), especially Neo-Confucian ideology. As Fridell (1976) points out, Juche also
incorporated aspects of Japanese colonial rule over Korea, including emperor-worship.
Furthermore, these authors argue that Juche combined aspects of different approaches to
Communist ideology with Confucianism to produce a unique brand of Korean socialism.
Suh (1988) and Kim (2014) highlight several important aspects of Kim Il-Sung's
formative years and rise to power that may have contributed to his creation of Juche and
especially of the personality cult. These include his childhood in a Christian family,
competition with other Korean revolutionary fighters in Manchuria, and return to Korea
after decades of exile with limited knowledge of the Korean language. Suh in particular
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has provided an extensive and rich biography of Kim Il-Sung. Juche ideology justified
the purges of his opponents who favored Stalinist or Maoist approaches to ruling North
Korea (Suh 1988, Kihl 1994, Lankov 2002). Kim (2012) and Kihl (1994) also argue that
the devastating loss of the Korean War (1950-1953) prompted the purges and
introduction of Juche to restore Kim's popularity with the North Korean people.
Other aspects will be also considered, including the role of Kim Jong Il in expanding the
personality cult to bolster his own legitimacy before his succession as leader of North
Korea, discussed by Lim (2011), and the idea of domestic isolationism, as coined by
Turku (2009), applied to Juche ideology.
This thesis is divided into five sections. The latter half of this introductory section
defines Juche as an ideology and explains its role in North Korea. It compares Juche to
the Communist ideologies of Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism to emphasize
how Juche is different from these approaches. The second section explains the historical
context of the creation of Juche. It focuses on the birth of Korean nationalism in the late
19th century and the period of Japanese colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945). It discusses
the roles of the Soviet Union and China in creating the first Korean Communist parties,
as well as Kim Il-Sung's rise to power with the help of the Soviet Union after the partition
of the Korean peninsula in 1945.
The third section focuses on North Korea after 1953, in the aftermath of the
Korean War and the death of Stalin, during which Kim consolidated his power and
introduced the idea of Juche. It discusses the international political context of the time
and how it influenced the implementation of Juche, with specific focus on the process of
de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union as well as the Sino-Soviet split and Kim's reluctance
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to align with either the Soviet Union or China. It examines the internal conflict occurring
within the Korean Workers' Party, which at the time was the disagreement between the
Soviet-aligned and China-aligned factions on how to govern North Korea. The section
examines Kim Il-Sung's own personal history and experiences and how they influenced
the personality cult. It considers his perceived weaknesses, especially during the
foundation of North Korea and after the Korean War, and why he enacted purges against
his opponents. It also considers the rivalry between Kim Il-Sung and President Rhee
Syngman of South Korea, who were both attempting to appear more genuinely Korean to
the world than the other, and the role of Juche in this context.
The fourth chapter examines in detail the personality cult of Kim Il-Sung and
provides concrete examples of its manifestations in North Korea. It discusses how Juche
justified and necessitated a cult of personality. It considers how aspects of Korean history
and culture, such as isolationism and Christianity, were utilized to legitimize the
personality cult and Kim's absolute power. It considers the influence of Korean
Confucianism as well as Japanese colonial rule and the distortion of the Confucian tenets
of filial piety and familial hierarchy in the creation of the personality cult. This chapter
also examines Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il-Sung, and his role in the creation of the
personality cult. It discusses the importance of including the Kim family in the
personality cult and their rewriting of Korean history in their favor in order to legitimize
the dynastic succession of power from father to son.
The conclusion summarizes the creation of Juche and the personality cult. It
argues that Juche was successfully implemented in North Korea because it utilized
uniquely Korean elements that catered to North Koreans' desire for national pride and
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esteem after a damaging and tumultuous period of history. It was also successful because
Kim ensured it would be the only ideology in North Korea through ruthless purges of
opponents and control of information. The conclusion considers contemporary
applications of the information presented in the thesis. Specifically, it will discuss how
the rigidity and unchanging nature of Juche has affected North Korea since the death of
Kim Il-Sung, and how the succession of power to Kim Jong Un, Kim Il-Sung's grandson,
may be understood through Juche and the personality cult.

What is Juche?
Juche, written as 주체 in North Korean Chosongul1, is a word of Sino-Korean
origin. It is formed by the hanja2 主 meaning lord, master, owner, or ruler, and 體
meaning body, whole, essence, or substance. It thus translates roughly to "master of one's
own body or self" and is often translated as "self-reliance" in political discourse. As Kim
Jong-Il notes in his 1982 treatise to the National Seminar on the Juche Idea, "Our leader
created the great Juche idea after acquiring a deep insight into the requirements of a new
era when the oppressed and humiliated masses of the people became masters of their own
destiny. Thus he developed their struggle for independence onto a higher plane and
opened up the age of Juche, a new era in the development of human history." (Kim 1982,

1

The Korean alphabet is called Chosongul in North Korea and Hangul (or Hangeul) in South Korea. Both
names correspond to the states' official Korean names: 조선민주주의인민공화국 (Chosŏn Minjujuŭi
Inmin Konghwaguk) for North Korea, and 대한민국 (Daehan Minguk) for South Korea, which in turn link
both states to periods of Korean history, the 조선 (Choson/Joseon) and 삼한 (Samhan) periods.
2

Hanja (한자, 漢字) is the Korean name for Chinese characters and was the main medium of reading and
writing Korean until the acceptance and proliferation of hangul in the 19th and 20th centuries. Sino-Korean
words may be written in hanja with Korean pronunciation, though "native" Korean words are always
written in hangul.
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3). Juche was thus intended to be the Korean people's chance to pave their own road, and
achieve socialist revolution, relying on their own minds and spirits rather than existing as
a people subjugated by the forces of imperialism. Specifically, the basis of Juche is
"Man,” who is master of all matters, especially his own fate. Juche declares that Man
may use his independence, creativity, and consciousness to bend Nature and Society to
his whims and create a world better suited to him.
Under the overarching principle of self-reliance, Juche aims to achieve several
goals in North Korea, which Kim termed the monolithic ideological system (Suh 1988,
302). With Juche as ideology, North Korea could achieve chaju (independence) in the
political realm, charip (self-sustenance) in economic endeavors, and chawi (self-defense)
in military affairs. These goals fit the notion that Man is the master of his own destiny,
and in more practical terms, that the master of revolution is the people, Koreans armed
with self-reliant thought and an ideology they may consider "uniquely Korean." French
(2005) argues that these principles have dictated much of North Korea's policies,
including negotiation on the international front—as chawi assumes all states have equal
rights and importance— and military-first policies to preserve independence (chaju) in
the face of imperialism.
The three elements of Juche, Nature, Society, and Man, may only come together
successfully under the guidance of the leader, suryong, who is the center of society (Suh
1988, 304). Loyalty to the leader is the core element of a victorious socialist revolution in
Korea, and in turn the core element of the Juche ideology. Thus, the ideology created a
framework in which the cult of personality of Kim Il-Sung was a justified and logical
method of inspiring unquestioning loyalty to the leader.
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Juche was first introduced in 1955 as a Korean expression of the universal
principles of Marxism-Leninism. Kim Il-Sung, in his 1955 speech on Juche, advised
against accepting dogmatic ideas and relying solely on foreign countries' experiences;
rather, he encouraged a critical analysis of other countries' socialist revolutions and a selfreliant approach to structuring the Korean socialist revolution. He specifically said,
"When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of
the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, it is all for the
purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution" (Kim 1955).
Although Kim acknowledged the basis of Juche in the "universal truth" of
Marxism-Leninism, all references to the latter were largely erased from official Juche
texts (French 2005, 33). French (2005) in particular argues that Kim initially emphasized
a creative departure from Marxism-Leninism rather than an outright replacement of it to
avoid falling out of favor with the Soviet Union, upon which North Korea was still
heavily dependent before the 1970s. Despite Kim's rejection of dogmatic theory, French
notes that Juche itself is "dogmatic in essence" and "operates on the basis that facts
should fit the theory" (French 2005, 32). The highly dogmatic nature of Juche is
essentially what granted Kim his absolute power over North Korea and has prevented any
large-scale reform or change within the state.
Juche attempted to break away from the materialist ideas of Marxism-Leninism
and emphasized instead the individual's (Man's) sovereignty over his own life and
destiny. According to Helgesen (1991), standard Marxism-Leninism thought was driven
by an overarching determinism, so that all forces were acting towards the creation of a
highly-developed socialist, and eventually communist, society, as soon as the proletarians
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came together as a community or collectivity. This thought also focused primarily on
social classes, productive forces, and political parties, with the idea that production and
material eventually gave way to advanced ideology and society. Juche lacked
determinism; Man alone was capable of morphing material and society at will.
Juche was considered revisionist by Soviet and other Marxists because it dictated
that a society could progress directly from feudalism to socialism without experiencing
capitalism, which is the stage necessary for inciting socialist revolution in standard
Marxist-Leninist thought. Standard Marxist thought also held the belief that society was
divided between the capitalist and proletarian classes, and differences did not exist within
the proletarian class. French notes that differentiations between workers and peasants
continued in North Korea despite attempts at proletarianization of peasants into workers
through collective farms. Juche's departure from the idea of class struggle was
appropriate to the Korean situation because Korea was still a feudal, agrarian nation with
little industry or capitalist structures in the 20th century. However, according to French,
Soviet Marxists were not pleased with Kim's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.
Kim's introductory 1955 speech on Juche, as well as all future mentions of Juche,
stress a necessity to "Koreanize" the socialist revolution, and to tailor it to the specific
needs of the Korean people. Helgesen argues that the need to create a "uniquely Korean"
approach to socialism was in part driven by the need to inspire ideologically the Korean
youth in a matter they would understand—Man is the master of his own destiny—rather
than through the abstract Marxist-Leninist notions of matter and determinism. In his 1984
treatise on Juche, Kim Jong Il states,
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The popular masses' consciousness of independence plays a decisive role in the
revolutionary movement. Therefore, in the revolution and construction one must
place the main stress on ideology and give priority over all work to the
remoulding of ideology, the political work, which is aimed at raising the
consciousness and activeness of the masses. (Kim 1984, 47)
Therefore, North Korean elites, especially Kim Il-Sung, were highly aware of the need to
invigorate the people through an ideology to which they could relate. Moreover,
Helgesen argues that this need ultimately stemmed from the inherently Confucian nature
of the Korean people, which he believes is inseparable from the idea of Korean culture
and did not align itself well with standard Marxist-Leninist thought. He argues both Kim
in North Korea and Mao in China had to "rectify" Marxism-Leninism to fit the culture of
the people in inherently Confucian societies. The Confucian nature of Juche will be
discussed to a greater extent in Section IV, which details the cult of personality of Kim IlSung and his family.
Juche is often referred to as "Kimilsungism" which bears different connotations
depending on the source. Within North Korean documents, Juche was referred to as
Kimilsungism to liken it to and elevate it to the level of Marxism-Leninism, especially
during the 1960s and 1970s when the monolithic ideological society was being actively
implemented in North Korea (Cheong 2000). Outside of North Korean political
discourse, Kimilsungism refers to Kim Il Sung's ideology, which includes Juche, the cult
of personality, militarization of society, and other aspects of his rule including purging.
Kimilsungism in this regard is often compared to Stalinism in that the rulers had
much in common, though references to Stalinism in North Korean documents are largely
absent. The most obvious comparisons to be made are the absolute rule and cult of
personality of both Kim and Stalin, the institutionalization of their ideas, as well as the
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establishment of monolithic ideological systems in North Korea and the Soviet Union,
control over all intellectual life within their respective societies, and a "political culture of
terror" (Cheong 2000, 157). Furthermore, Kim began to consolidate his power through
ruthless purges in 1956, demonstrating his displeasure with the idea of de-Stalinization,
and official North Korean documents continued to praise Stalin while other socialist
states portrayed him as having distorted Leninist ideas (Cheong 2000). Kim's knowledge
of Stalinism and Stalin's role in the establishment of a North Korean state will be
discussed in Section II of this thesis.
Kim also utilized aspects of Maoism in creating the Juche ideology, though
official documents on Juche do not acknowledge a Maoist influence or basis as they do
with Marxism-Leninism.3 The most important borrowings from Maoism are the emphasis
on the mass line and need for a Party for the masses, and the role of the national leader
(suryong) as a guide for policy decisions at all levels. In his 1955 speech, Kim Il-Sung
emphasized the masses at length, and defined them:
By the masses we mean the main masses we are relying on — the workers and
peasants, and our allies who support and follow us. We should listen to them and
defend their interests. Everyone, whether a Party worker, an administrative
official or a functionary in a social organization, must work consistently in the
interests of the revolution and the masses. (Kim 1955)
The emphasis on the masses was a departure from the elitist party system of the Soviet
Union; Kim was proud to make the Korean Workers' Party an inclusive one, and its
membership of over one million by 1955 created solidarity within the north and was
important in establishing Kim's popularity in the formative years of the North Korean
state. Kim's rise to power will be further discussed in Section II, which provides the
3

Various sources claim these Maoist influences. See French (2005), Armstrong (2004), Kim (2012), Suh
(1988).
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historical context for the creation of Juche. Another strategy Kim used for gaining
popularity and legitimacy among the masses was "on-the-spot" guidance tours, also taken
from Maoism, in which Kim and his son Kim Jong-Il often visited factories and
collective farms throughout the country to provide individualized guidance and advice to
the workers there. These visits became more staged, highly-reported, and subject to
fanfare as the personality cult expanded and became more intrusive.
It is important to distinguish the differences between Maoist and Juche thought.
Maoist thought emphasized the masses—peasants and workers—while downplaying the
importance of intellectuals and scholars. Juche theory supports an alliance between
intellectuals, workers, and peasants, which French (2005, 36) postulates may be a
reaction to the large departure of intellectuals from north to south after the official
establishment of North Korea. Another crucial difference between the two is Chinese
socialism's ability to change and adapt, especially considering the usurping of supposed
political and theoretical absolutes in the transition from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping in
the late 1970s and 80s. In comparison to Maoism, French argues that "Juche presents a
substantially more fixed, rigid, and hierarchical ethic, based to a significant degree on the
ancient systems of organization and caste structure in Korea but in communist clothing
and with new gods" (French 2005, 41). Juche, rigid and inflexible, has resisted virtually
all reform even in the face of economic disaster.
Official North Korean publications celebrate the unchanging nature of Juche; Kim
Jong-Il's 1991 speech to senior officials of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party
of Korea proclaimed, "Our socialism centered on the masses shall not perish" and "The
practical experience we have gained in our revolution clearly shows that when the Juche
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stand is firmly maintained, any problem, however complex and difficult... can be solved"
(Kim 1991, 1, 13). Kim Jong-Il developed the idea of "Socialism of Our Style," also
called "Our-Style Socialism" or "Korean-Style Socialism", in his 1990 speech delivered
to senior officials of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. In this
speech, he praised "the immortal Juche idea" (Kim 1990, 3), credited it for North Korea's
survival as other socialist states began to crumble, and blamed their demise on their strict
applications of Soviet-style socialism rather than creating their "own" styles as had Kim
Il-Sung with Juche.
Kim's monolithic ideological system of North Korea, as mentioned, consisted of
Juche in ideology, chaju (independence) in politics, charip (self-sustenance) in
economics, and chawi (self-defense) in military affairs. These principles all dictated a
need for independence, self-reliance, and a strong patriotic or nationalist consciousness.
Despite the nationalist sentiment intrinsic in the very idea of Juche being a "uniquely
Korean" ideology, Kim discussed in his 1955 speech the complementary nature of
patriotism and internationalism in regards to the international socialist movement. He
says,
He who does not love his own country cannot be loyal to internationalism, and he
who is unfaithful to internationalism cannot be faithful to his own country and
people. A true patriot is precisely an internationalist and vice versa.
If we cast aside all that is good in our country and only copy and memorize
foreign things in ideological work, it will certainly bring losses to our revolution,
and thereby prevent us from properly carrying out our internationalist obligations
to the international revolutionary cause. (Kim 1955)
Therefore, the patriotism in Juche was necessary for creating a strong socialist state
which in turn strengthened the international socialist movement and the solidarity among
socialist states in the face of imperialism. However, both Suh (1988) and French (2005)

13

note that Kim's embrace of Marxist-Leninist internationalism allowed him to be
theoretically anti-colonial and strongly anti-Western while still appearing globally
progressive. In general, Juche has been described as "a doctrine of markedly xenophobic
character" (Aguirre 2014, 1926), '"nothing more than xenophobic nationalism" (Suh
1988, 313), and a "racial-nationalist history" (Seth 2011, 357), as well as "Korean selfreliance steeped in hyper-nationalism" (Turku 2016, 91), because of its implication of
the Korean people as racially pure and virtuous and all other peoples as inferior and
threatening. The nationalist or hyper-nationalist sentiment inherent in Juche was a
response to a history of Korean subjugation under dominant powers and the need to
establish national pride after the Korean War, both of which will be further discussed in
Sections II, III, and IV of this thesis.

14

Section II: Historical Context
It is necessary to understand the historical context of Korea to understand the creation of
Juche. The situation on the Korean peninsula in the 20th century, namely Japanese
colonial rule from 1910-1945 and the partition of the peninsula after World War II,
spawned the first Korean nationalist movements of which Kim Il-Sung was a part. For
Kim and other young Koreans at the time, struggle for Korean independence from Japan
was part of daily life and more nationalist than socialist in nature.
The origins of Korean nationalism may be found as early as the 1880s, during the
decline of the Yi or Joseon/Choson dynasty, which lasted from 1392 to 1910 (Lee 1963).
From the 1880s onwards, Korean intellectuals began a reevaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of traditional Korean thought, especially in the face of new Western feats of
strength. Many of the first nationalist publications,4 as analyzed by Robinson and
Robinson (1986), grappled with the concept of sadae,5 or the Yi dynasty's subservience
to the greater power China, and how to frame Korean identity within this context. The
Chinese influence over Korea extended into the cultural and political spheres, including
the adoption of Neo-Confucianism as the official ideology of the society, the emphasis
placed on civil service examinations, the use of Chinese characters (hanja) in writing, and
a hierarchical social stratification.
The negative view on sadae, and the desire to express Korean "national spirit"
(Robinson and Robinson 1986, 41), also stemmed from the Yi dynasty's inability to
4

The first nationalist organization in Korea, the Independence Club, founded in 1896, often attacked the
concept of sadae in its official publications, and was disbanded by the court in 1898.
5

Sadae literally means "serving the great" and was a neutral term to describe Chinese-Korean relations
during the Yi dynasty (Robinson and Robinson 1986). Yi Korea was a part of the Chinese tributary system.
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prevent foreign interference in Korean affairs, especially a violent encounter with a U.S.
armed merchant steamer in 1866, intrusive railroad construction started by Russia in the
north, and increased pressure from Japan in the 1890s.6 Korean intellectuals blamed
Korean subservience on the Yi court's dependence on dogma7, which they believed
stifled innovation on the peninsula. Robinson and Robinson (1986) note that the first
mention of juchesong (consciousness of autonomy) occured in this period, in the writings
of intellectual and historian (and later, political exile) Sin Chaeho. Sin was interested in
developing a Korean historical consciousness independent of what he believed was
previously distorted by Confucian ideas of morality and Sinocentrism. Therefore, the
origins of the Juche concept may be traced to expressly nationalist, not socialist,
discourse.
Indeed, most scholars (Suh 1988, Armstrong 2003, French 2005, Seth 2011, Kim
2012) agree that the first socialist-leaning organizations founded in colonial Korea were
less concerned with ideology than with liberating Korea from colonial rule. The first leftleaning Korean group, the Korean Socialist Party, was founded in 1918 by anti-Japanese
guerrilla fighter and Korean Bolshevik Yi Tonghwi for Korean exiles living in the
Russian Far East (Armstrong 2003, 10). By the early 1920s, the party had nearly seven
thousand members, and communist thought became the standard of anti-colonial political
discourse and resistance among Koreans both in and outside of Korea.
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The General Sherman Incident will be mentioned again in Section IV as an example of the rewriting of
Korean history to suit the Kim personality cult.
7

It is interesting to note that this debate still holds in North Korea today. Sadae still exists in practice in
North Korea, which remains dependent on China to a large degree, and reliance on dogma ultimately has
once again stifled Korean innovation.
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Korean Nationalism and Communism
Seth (2011) argues that the Korean nationalist movement gained traction in Korea rather
quickly and uniformly because of the "strong sense of Korean cultural identity, the
homogeneity of Korean society, and the intrusive and intense nature of Japanese colonial
rule" (Seth 2011, 299). Japanese rule over Korea in the first half of the twentieth century
was harsh, destructive, and extremely debilitating to the Korean people (Kim 2012, 321).
In the first decade of rule, the Japanese, through a highly centralized system, relied on an
intense military policy to quell any and all Korean resistance, and stripped Koreans of
civil liberties such as free speech, suffrage, and representative government (Kim 2012,
322). The peninsula was exploited by Japan to serve solely Japanese purposes, and
Japanese people viewed Koreans as a weak, conquered, and culturally inferior people.
Koreans, conversely, saw themselves as culturally superior to the Japanese, and thus
continued resistance attempts against Japan.
The proliferation of the "national spirit" in Korea in the early 20th century,
despite repressive efforts by the Japanese, is generally credited to Korean homogeneity
and historical unity. Robinson (1988) observes: "The Korean masses were... unified and
culturally homogenous, sharing a well-developed folk culture closely tied to their long
history as a tightly knit agrarian society—a fact that eased the process of developing a
strong national consciousness in the twentieth century" (Robinson 1988, 17). The most
important resistance movement, the March First Movement, began on March 1, 1919.
Both peaceful and violent demonstrations took place with nearly two million participants
(Seth 2011, 269). The Japanese retaliated harshly, killing and arresting thousands, and
eventually suppressed the demonstrations. However, the movement was a success in
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uniting the Korean people in the shared desire for independence. The March First
Movement is considered the birth of organized Korean nationalism, or the consolidation
of several small nationalist groups into one large and inclusive movement (Seth 2011,
269). In the years leading up to the movement, independence groups formed by exiles
appeared in Manchuria and Vladivostok.
Despite the success of the March First Movement, formal Korean organizations
did not have much success due to ideological disagreements and Japanese oppression.
Japanese colonial rule over the Korean peninsula stifled any calls for independence or
public nationalist movements, preventing any members of the Korean professional class
from gaining the reputation and credibility needed to serve as a national leader.
Therefore, the men who did eventually become national leaders in 1945-49 were exiles
with no domestic legacies—Rhee Syngman in the south, and Kim Il-Sung in the north.
Little is known about Kim Il-Sung's life before his return to Korea in 1945 due to
the incomplete and often fabricated information available to researchers.8 He was born
Kim Song-Ju in 1912 to a peasant family near Pyongyang, who attempted to escape
poverty by moving to Manchuria (Suh 1988, 3). He became involved in various antiJapanese struggles in Manchuria (controlled by the Japanese and called Manchukuo from
1933-1945), joining Korean nationalist groups and the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army in
1935 (Seth 2011, 310). He led several invasions of Japanese outposts along the ChinaNorth Korea border in the late 1930s. Around the same time, Kim changed his name to IlSung, meaning "one star" (Suh 1988, 11). Kim became a notable guerrilla fighter and was
well-respected by other guerrilla fighters and members of the Chinese Communist Party,
8

Section III considers the influence of Kim's formative years on his policies.
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of which he was also a member. His education in Chinese schools and fluency in the
language helped him establish rapport with high-ranking Chinese guerrillas, which may
have spared his life in the Minsaengdan purges of 1934.9 These purges occurred within
the Korean groups of the Chinese Communist Party in order to expel suspected Japanese
infiltration, and Han (2013) notes that an estimated 500 to 2,000 Korean communists and
sympathizers were killed or punished in these purges. Japanese forces eventually quelled
all guerrilla activity occurring in Manchuria, and Kim fled to the Soviet Union from 1940
to 1945.
After the formal Korean Communist Party collapsed in 1928, the largelycommunist Korean resistance movement survived Japanese attempts at destruction
through underground meetings in Korea, absorption into foreign parties, and exiled
communists' meetings abroad. Different factions, or groups of communist revolutionary
guerrilla fighters, were thus created based on their locations, and their members would
become the founders and elites of the North Korean state after 1945. Kim Il-Sung's
guerrilla unit was known to be active in the Kapsan region, near the Korean border with
Manchuria, and his group came to be known as the Kapsan faction (Lankov 2002, 22).
The Korean Socialist Party, founded in Russia, would form the faction of Soviet Koreans.
Most Soviet Koreans were born in Russia and had little to no connection to the Korean
peninsula. The Yan'an faction consisted of Korean communists who left Korea in the
1920s and 30s to form the largest Korean Communist organization abroad in Yan'an,
China. While the Soviet Koreans were the most directly connected to Soviet-style

9

The Minsaengdan, or People's Livelihood Corps, was a Korean group within the Chinese Communist
Party in Manchuria. The Minsaengdan purges were an unfortunate result of the mistrust among Chinese,
Koreans, and Japanese in Manchuria in the early 1930s.
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socialism, the Yan'an faction brought Maoist political ideas to North Korea. Finally, the
Domestic faction consisted of Korean communists who remained in Korea during the
colonial period and carried on underground revolutionary activity. The conflicts among
the different factions, who represented vastly different beliefs and approaches, would
shape North Korea in the 1950s after the Korean War.

Korean Liberation and Statehood
The question of Soviet influence or control over the establishment of a North Korean
state is often brought up in literature on North Korea. Lankov (2002) argues that both
external and internal factors must be considered in the formation of the North Korean
state, thus it is a product of both indigenous social change and Soviet control.
Armstrong (2003) notes that despite fabricated information exaggerating Kim IlSung's role in the struggle for Korean independence, Kim did become one of the leading
figures in the Chinese and Korean guerrilla armies by the late 1930s, and his prominence
contributed to his and the Kapsan faction's rise to power in North Korea. Armstrong
argues that the direct link between guerrilla prominence and Korean leadership explains
much of Kim's policies, including Juche, as he and other North Korean elites were shaped
by their guerrilla experiences (Armstrong 2003, 27).
The Soviet Union became involved in the formation of a North Korean state at the
end of World War II. The special forces of the Soviet Far East prepared to enter the war
against Japan in late 1945, and at this time also prepared to meet with Manchurian
guerrilla fighters to designate Chinese and Korean units to work towards reconstruction
in their home countries (Armstrong 2003, 38). Armstrong (2003), Lankov (2002), and
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Suh (1988) agree that Kim Il-Sung was not Stalin's handpicked choice for leading the
Soviet occupation government, as he himself preferred the Soviet Koreans to the
peripheral Kapsan faction to which Kim Il-Sung belonged. At the time, the Soviet Union
planned to act defensively to protect its borders and prevent the re-militarization of Japan
rather than spread communist thought through East Asia. These authors also agree that
the Soviet Union was quite unprepared to occupy Korea after the Japanese surrender,
lacking any Korean experts or interpreters. Lankov (2002) observes that most Soviet
decisions regarding Korea were improvised, and the foundation of a pro-Soviet
government was influenced by the necessity to create a buffer against potential Japanese
threats. Meanwhile, the United States began to ponder the future of the Korean peninsula
in 1943, well before the conclusion of World War II. After Japan surrendered in 1945, the
United States hastily decided to split the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel to prevent
potential Soviet and leftist expansion into East Asia.
The Allied forces agreed, at the Moscow Conference of 1945, that the division
would be temporary. Specifically, the agreement called for the establishment of a
provisional democratic government in Korea, as well as a Joint Commission of United
States command in southern Korea and Soviet Union command in northern Korea to aid
in the formation of the provisional government. The Joint Commission and the Korean
government would form a trusteeship to aid in the political, economic, and social growth
of the Korean peninsula, and the proposals would then be agreed upon by the
governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the United Kingdom to
create a four-power trusteeship over Korea to last up to five years. The Joint Commission
was impossible to enact in the context of the Cold War; as Kim states, “To guarantee the
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participation of rightists in Joint Commission activities, the United States never adhered
to the strict application of the accord” (Kim 2012, 374). Similarly, the Soviet Union
opposed any compromises that would reduce its role in northern Korea. Although Korea
was free of Japanese rule, it had not achieved the independence it so strongly desired;
conversely, Korea had no role in its own fate and it was now a divided peninsula. The
feelings of betrayal and disappointment manifested in large riots and uprisings in South
Korea and certainly contributed to anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiments in North Korea
that supported Juche theory.
The Manchurian guerrilla groups residing in the Soviet Union were incorporated
into the Soviet Far Eastern Command. Kim Il-Sung was elected by fellow guerrilla
leaders to represent Korean communists' interests in this new military organization, and
was highly recommended to Soviet forces (Lim 2008, 15). As mentioned, Kim was not
handpicked by Stalin to lead the occupation government, but because of his prominent
guerrilla background and esteem among his comrades, he was deemed more appealing to
the Korean people than any Soviet Koreans who had never set foot on Korean soil. Kim
Il-Sung arrived in Pyongyang in late September 1945, and gave his first speech to the
Korean people on October 14, 1945. While Soviet forces in northern Korea at the time
heavily promoted the image of Kim as leader, referring to him as "leader of the Korean
people," Lankov argues that "...In 1946 and even in 1949 he was hardly the real ruler of
Korea. The Soviet military authorities and the apparatus of advisers had a decisive
influence on the life of the country, and in the first years of the DPRK Kim was only
nominally ruler" (Lankov 2002, 59). Regardless, the Soviet Union played a large part in
bolstering his popularity as a leader, placing his picture in public places next to that of
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Stalin, and naming the main university in North Korea the Kim Il-Sung University in
1946 (Seth 2011, 314). The Soviet Union helped create a centralized government with
branches on all local levels, enacted a massive land redistribution reform in 1946 and
1947, and made the first steps towards a command economy in 1947 through the
nationalization of industry. At the same time, the Soviet Union also expropriated for its
own economic needs the few Korean industrial facilities that still stood after World War
II, and Soviet forces were reported to be lacking discipline and self-control in their
treatment of the Korean people (Kim 2013, 68). Kim Il-Sung began exercising and
increasing his power over North Korea after the Korean War, when he introduced Juche,
distanced himself from the Soviet Union, and purged his political opponents.10

The Korean War
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was officially proclaimed on eptember 9,
1948, less than a month after the formation of the Republic of Korea in the south. As Kim
(2012) notes, each state claimed to be the sole government of the entire Korean peninsula
and was intent on reunifying Korea on its own terms.
Kim Il-Sung was ready to invade South Korea by late 1949, and had begun
lobbying for a Soviet-backed invasion. According to Kim (2012), the oviet Union “preplanned, blessed, and directly aided” (406) the North Korean war effort, and insisted that
China also back North Korea. Although the Soviet Union was prepared for war with
10

It is worth noting that Kim was quite popular as a leader in the early years of North Korean statehood.
Several authors (Lankov 2002, Seth 2011, Kim 2012) observe that protests against his regime simply did
not occur, especially in comparison to the mass protests and demonstrations occurring against the Rhee
regime and US influence in South Korea at this time. The peasant farmers who benefitted from the land
reforms of 1946-7, on top of being welcomed as Party members, provided a powerful basis of support that
helped legitimize Kim's rule early on.
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South Korea, it is difficult to say whether Stalin and Mao had previously discussed the
possibility of war. Korea, “Mao’s second priority in terms of foreign relations” (Westad
1998, 12), did not even come up in conversation at the 1949 Moscow Summit between
China and the Soviet Union. However, Whiting (1999) argues that Mao was probably
informed of the impending attack on outh Korea due to a “timely relocation” (45) of
CCP troops from southern China to Manchuria prior to the onset of the Korean War.
However, Cotton and Neary (1989) and Westad (1998) suggest that neither the Soviet
Union nor China had any particular interest in invading South Korea, especially given
talin’s wariness of rousing U. . suspicions as expressed during the Moscow ummit,
but ultimately both talin and Mao approved Kim’s plan and provided aid.
The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the
38th parallel and swiftly overwhelmed the unprepared South Korean forces (Kim 2012,
407). The United States sent support under General MacArthur, and a UN Security
Council resolution on July 7 established him as commander of all United Nations
Command forces, which included forces from fifteen nations and the armed forces of the
Republic of Korea (Kim 2012, 409). North Korean forces advanced far south into South
Korea, but the U.S.-led counterattack of September pushed the forces back over the 38th
parallel and then attempted to advance into North Korea with the intent of reunifying the
peninsula. At this point, Mao hesitated to send Chinese troops to support North Korea,
but Stalin eventually changed his mind (Westad 1988, 13). Mao sent troops into North
Korea in October of 1950 under the guise of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, to
enable China to enter war against the United States without a formal declaration (Kim
2012, 413). The gravity of the Chinese intervention pushed UN forces completely out of
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North Korea. Chinese and UN forces would continue to fight along the 38th parallel, and
occupation of Seoul changed four times throughout the duration of the war (Kim 2012,
414). Although all sides were seemingly ready to negotiate an end to the war in 1951, the
war lasted until 1953 due to disagreements between Stalin and Mao as well as mixed
messages from Washington to U.S. forces in South Korea.
The Korean War drastically changed the political environment in North Korea.
Emerging from an unsuccessful and costly war he had initiated, Kim Il-Sung acted to
preserve his power and reinvigorate the North Korean people swiftly and effectively. The
external conflict occurring among socialist countries at the time as well as the internal
conflict in North Korea among the different factions, and the rivalry between North and
South Korea, provided Kim Il-Sung the breeding grounds for Juche ideology and the cult
of personality.
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Section III: North Korea after the Korean War
The historical context of the Korean peninsula in the late 19th century and early 20th
century set the scene for the creation of Juche ideology, but it was successfully
implemented and institutionalized because of the Korean War and the domestic and
international conditions of the 1950s. The North Korea of today began to take its distinct
shape in the 1950s, and Juche and the cult of personality would be refined well into the
1970s and as late as the 1990s.
The Korean War and the immediate aftermath was a time of weakness and
uncertainty for Kim. As early as 1951, Kim Il-Sung began to blame other elites for the
losses of the Korean War, during which North Korea suffered the most damage. Kim
lashed out against his own faction, as well as the general undisciplined conduct by
generals and officials and mismanagement of the war effort (Suh 1988, 122). Prominent
officials were expelled from the party, though they were reinstated once the war situation
appeared less dire. The first major purge also occurred in 1951. Ho Ka-i, the highestranking Soviet Korean, believed the Korean Workers' Party should have been an elitist
party in the style of the Soviet Union, while Kim argued for a mass party in the style of
Maoist China. Ultimately, Ho was purged for disobeying Kim's orders and the Soviet
Koreans began to lose favor within the party.
Although the Soviet Union and China both contributed to the war effort as well as
postwar reconstruction efforts, Chinese contributions far outnumbered Soviet aid and, as
Lankov (2002) notes, the Chinese did not attempt to interfere with domestic North
Korean politics as the Soviet Union had done. Lankov suggests that the war significantly
weakened Soviet influence in the country, and Suh (1988) notes that this fading influence
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gave Kim free rein in hurling a variety of accusations at Ho Ka-i. In fact, Soviet influence
on North Korea had begun to fade before the Korean War. "...The fact that the Workers'
Party had a very small number of Marxist ideologues, provided a fertile ground for
‘Korean style’ thinking and national ideology to take root" (Kim 2013, 69), although the
Korean War also spawned internal factional conflict in North Korea.
The failure of the Korean War to unify the peninsula and the lack of direct Soviet
military participation weakened the legitimacy of Kim's rule. Kim was then challenged
by the entire Domestic faction and its leader, Pak Hon-yong, who had enjoyed support
from communists in both North and South Korea during and after Japanese colonial rule.
The Domestic faction planned a secret military coup against Kim's regime, but all
conspirators were arrested by early 1953 and were either executed or sentenced to long
prison terms.
In his 1955 speech introducing Juche, Kim blamed the failure of a certain antiJapanese struggle on these very "factionalists":
It is true that the struggle was greatly hampered by the factionalists who had
slipped into it. Considering that even after liberation, the Pak Hon Yong-Li Sung
Yop spy clique crept into our ranks and wrought mischief, it goes without saying
that in those days the factionalists could carry on subversive activities more
easily. But, even so, was the struggle itself wrong? No, it was not. Although the
struggle ended in failure because of a few bad elements who had wormed their
way into the leadership of the organization, we cannot deny its revolutionary
character; we should learn a lesson from that failure. (Kim 1955)
It is difficult to say with certainty whether the struggle in question, the June Tenth
Independence Movement (1926), failed because of factionalist "subversive activities" or
because of Japanese counterrevolutionary forces, but the reference casts suspicion on the
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factionalists' true motives, while implying that Kim always fought for the good of the
Korean people and the Korean revolution.
In 1953 and 1954, Kim ordered a large restructuring of the party, filling old
positions with loyalists and creating new positions for those who pledged absolute loyalty
to him. At this time, Kim also introduced economic policies focused exclusively on
heavy industry at the expense of the production of consumer goods, policies later justified
by the principles of Juche. He publicly confronted anyone who opposed him or who had
the potential to oppose him; he also began to promote himself as the chief, sole
propagator of the Korean revolution at this time and spoke out harshly against potential
factional struggle.
Kim's crackdown on internal factional disagreements and perceived disloyalty in
the 1950s may be explained by his own perceived weaknesses following the failure of the
Korean War. Kim particularly wished to establish his own revolutionary experiences as
the only proper Korean revolutionary struggle while also advising that the different
revolutionary backgrounds of North Korean elites were not sufficient reasons for
factional struggle (Suh 1988, 142-143). In reality, Kim's revolutionary experiences,
largely in Manchuria, were less "Korean" than those of the Yan'an or Domestic factions.
Kim insisted on propagating what he considered truly Korean and completely dismissing
anything else. His specific definitions of Korean-ness were an expression of what Suh
(1988) calls his attempts "to find his Korean self-identity" (143) as he may have felt
inferior to the Domestic faction Koreans, who had remained in Korea throughout
Japanese colonial rule, and superior to the Soviet Koreans, many of who had never been
to Korea.
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Kim went so far as to ridicule Ho Ka-i for claiming to understand the needs of the
Korean Workers' Party without being able to speak proper Korean. Meanwhile, Kim,
having spent most of his life in Manchuria, arrived in Pyongyang in 1945 with little grasp
of the Korean language himself. His first speech, written by Soviet officials, was littered
with Russian idioms that did not translate well into Korean and confused much of the
crowd (Lankov 2002). Therefore, his ruthlessness towards his opponents in the 1950s
may have been a manifestation of his perceived shortcomings, especially his insecurity
within his own Korean-ness, which weakened his claim of being the sole propagator of
the Korean revolution.
The external and internal conflict occurring in the early 1950s provided the
context for the official introduction of Juche in Kim Il-Sung's 1955 speech, "On
eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche in ideological work."
Despite official North Korean claims that Kim had developed Juche as early as the 1930s
(at the age of eighteen), the content of the speech reveals that it was initially used to
attack the other factions and delegitimize their own revolutionary struggles, which Kim
claimed were not true to "Korean traditions" and too dependent on foreign ideas. In this
speech, Kim warned that the Korean revolution could not succeed if it ignored the
particular circumstances of Korea, including its traditions and history. He says, "...many
of our functionaries are ignorant of our country's history, and so do not strive to discover
and carry forward its fine traditions. Unless this is corrected, it will lead, in the long run,
to the negation of Korean history" (Kim 1955). It becomes apparent that the
"functionaries" to whom Kim refers are the Soviet Koreans, most of whom had never
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lived in Korea and could be accused of ignorance of its history and customs. His attack
becomes more specific when he singles out Soviet Korean Pak Chang Ok:
The mistakes made recently by Pak Chang Ok and his kind, too, may be attributed
to their negation of the history of the Korean literary movement. They closed their
eyes to the struggle of the fine writers of the "KAPF" — Koreen (Coreen) Artiste
Proletarienne Federation-and to the splendid works of Pak Yon Am, Chong Da
San and other progressive scholars and writers of our country. We told them to
make a profound study of those things and give them wide publicity, but they did
not do so. (Kim 1955)
It is difficult to ascertain whether Kim himself was deeply familiar with what he
refers to as the fine traditions and history of Korea at this time, and his knowledge of the
Korean literary movement is especially doubtful due to his lack of formal education and
having grown up in China surrounded by Soviet and Chinese socialist works. Lankov
ascertains that "...his [Kim's] weaknesses were determined by an obvious lack of general
education; he hardly ever had time for serious study" (Lankov 2002, 62), and that his
emphasis on Korean tradition in Juche stems from his own rudimentary understanding of
society through familiar Korean traditions. The works of Korean Neo-Confucian scholar
Chong Da San, mentioned in the excerpt above, did play a role in shaping Juche
ideology,11 therefore, it may be concluded that Kim familiarized himself with Korean
literature before the 1960s when Juche began to be heavily promoted.
The death of Stalin and the Sino-Soviet split also affected Kim's domestic
decisions. Krushchev's proposal of "peaceful co-existence" among socialist and nonsocialist states did not sit well with Kim, who still harbored plans to unify the Korean
peninsula under his rule despite the failure of the Korean War (Szalontai 2005, 179).
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Chong Da San's works and their influence on Juche ideology will be discussed in Section IV.
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Furthermore, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the eventual Sino-Soviet split
actually benefitted Kim Il-Sung. It allowed him to play both sides to secure aid from each
country, especially in the early 1960s (Szalontai 2005, 200). This break in international
socialist solidarity gave Kim more freedom to pursue policies independent of the Soviet
Union and of China, and to attack Soviet- and Chinese-aligned members of the Workers'
Party.
Kim was particularly displeased with the de-Stalinization process, seeing it as a
direct threat to his own regime (Szalontai 2005, 187). Internationally, he began to side
largely with China. Szalontai notes that "Pyongyang's intraparty propaganda outdid even
Beijing in reviling Krushchev" (Szalontai 2005, 200). Domestically, he took out his anger
on the Soviet Koreans, whom he accused of defaming Stalin. Kim also claimed that
"Some... disparaged Korea's traditional legacy as backward and held up the Soviet culture
as modern and advanced" (Kim 2013, 78). Some were removed from their posts, but the
purges were only beginning to escalate.
During the August 1956 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party,
in what is known as the August Incident, several members of the Yan'an faction and
some Soviet Koreans openly criticized Kim and his policies. News of this challenge
traveled, and a Sino-Soviet delegation was sent to Pyongyang to pressure Kim into
loosening his grip on power and pardoning those he planned to purge. Kim did not heed
the delegation, instead enacting large-scale purges that virtually wiped out the Yan'an
faction by 1958. The following years also saw the political annihilation of the remaining
Soviet Koreans. Most were forced to return to the Soviet Union, but many others faced
interrogation, forced labor, and execution within North Korea (Lim 1983). Lim Un, a
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North Korean defector and former official, reports that "...after the war, over 70 generals
were massacred or purged... This means that ninety-five percent of the generals who
participated in the Korean War were purged by Kim Il-Sung" (Lim 1982, 196).
In terms of internal struggle, Kim had emerged as the single victor by the end of
the 1950s, and had established that dissidence was unacceptable through violent purges
that resulted in the deaths of thousands from all ranks of society. Lankov notes that Kim
had proven to be a "skilled tactician" and demonstrated "...an uncanny ability to exploit
contradictions between his enemies, as well as his friends" (Lankov 2002, 62) in the
1950s. By the early 1960s, Kim Il-Sung had successfully consolidated his power over
North Korea. By the late 1960s, Kim Il-Sung began to distance himself from China as its
generosity in providing aid had waned. Freed from international pressures linked to the
Soviet Korean and Yan'an factions, as well as freedom from Soviet and Chinese
influences, Kim was able to launch his Juche ideology in full force. Although Juche had
first been introduced in his 1955 speech, it had been notably absent from all other
discourse until 1963. Kim had been wary of propagating Juche while still dependent on
the Soviet Union and China, but the new international scene from the late 1950s to the
late 1960s brought Juche to the forefront of North Korean ideological and political
discourse, which in turn gave way to the Kim cult of personality.

North Korea-South Korea Rivalry
Kim Il-Sung and North Korea also had to face a growing rivalry with South Korea after
the Korean War hardened the division of the peninsula and bolstered antagonism between
the two states. In the aftermath of the Korean War, both states sought to project their
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version of Korean-ness as the sole version, refusing to acknowledge the existence of two
separate Korean states.
Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, was essentially leveled by the destruction
of the Korean War. Although Pyongyang was rebuilt by the painstaking labor and
sacrifices of North Koreans, Kim Il-Sung officially receives the credit. The city
experienced its own rapid growth through what Atkins (1996) deems the "propaganda
gift" (3) of emphasizing the role of North Korea as victim of the Korean War and of past
oppression. The state was able to mobilize its population into reconstructing the city at a
rapid and impressive pace. In general, annual economic growth in North Korea far
surpassed that in South Korea in the early postwar years, reaching 20 percent in 1961
(Kim 2012), though it was a poor reflection of general living standards and the condition
was very short-lived. Pyongyang's rapid reconstruction and urbanization were an effort to
project North Korean superiority over South Korea at a time when both were vying for
international legitimacy.
Beyond proving their economic legitimacy, the two Korean states were locked in
an ideological battle stemming from the Cold War division of the peninsula. Rhee
Syngman, the first president of South Korea, was a devout anticommunist who believed
that embracing communism meant rejecting traditional thought and culture. Helegesen
(1991) argues that Rhee, along with most Western leaders at the time, viewed
communism as "...a break with everything considered to be good custom or convention,
with accepted norms of behavior and morality," and specifically to Korea, "...it was
portrayed as being anti-Korean, culturally alienating and therefore a threat to the people's
national identity" (Helgesen 1991, 192). Therefore, Juche had to emphasize (and even
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overemphasize) Korean culture and thought to ensure Kim's regime in North Korea was a
legitimate expression of Korean-ness.
The hyper-nationalist and even xenophobic sentiment of Juche ideology may have
also arisen as a direct opposition to Rhee Syngman's personal beliefs and ideologies. In a
1904 patriotic work titled The Spirit of Independence, Rhee bemoaned the state of the
Korean peninsula in comparison with advanced and prosperous Western nations and the
Koreans' rejection of foreign influence to preserve its own weakened structures. He
argues that Koreans should "...learn and follow the methods of foreigners so that we can
benefit from them" (Rhee 1904), 12 especially through education and scholarship, in order
to properly exercise the right of self-government. Later, somewhat similarly to Kim IlSung, Rhee received formal education abroad in the United States before returning to
South Korea to become its first leader. The large degree of Western influence on Rhee's
ideologies and rule over South Korea were certainly threatening and seen as illegitimate
in the eyes of Kim and North Korean elites, who considered South Korea a puppet of
U.S. imperialism, and may have contributed to the exaggeration of Korean racial
superiority in Juche ideology.
It appears Kim was aware of this rivalry and necessity to "out-Korea" South
Korea when first introducing Juche in 1955. He stated,
The Kwangju Student Incident... was a mass struggle in which tens of thousands
of Korean youths and students rose against Japanese imperialism; it played a big
part in inspiring the anti-Japanese spirit in broad sections of the Korean youth. As
a matter of course, we should publicize this movement widely and educate youth
and students in the brave fighting spirit displayed by their forerunners. Our
propaganda workers have failed to do so. Instead, Syngman Rhee has been
making propaganda of this movement in his favour. This has created a false
12

Cited from Sources of Korean Tradition, Vol. II, 2000, edited by Yong-ho Ch'oe, Peter H. Lee, and Wm.
Theodore de Barry.
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impression that the Communists disregard national traditions. What a dangerous
thing! It will be impossible for us to win over the south Korean youth if we go on
working in this way. (Kim 1955)
Kim was aware of the necessity to embellish episodes of recent Korean history "in his
favor" so that these episodes became exemplary of the socialist Korean revolution of the
north rather than the anticommunist movements of the south. This is an early example of
the rewriting and fabrication of Korean history that occurred in North Korea to justify
Juche as the logical, and only, contemporary expression of Korean national identity. At
this time, as Xu (2016) argues, the Korean governments "realized that building historical
narratives [became] a race in which governments competed for political legitimacy" (Xu
2016, 139).
The reality is that Kim's and Rhee's ideologies and speeches bore a number of
striking similarities and both regimes sought to use Korean-ness as propaganda to
maintain their own strength in a time of instability. By juxtaposing Kim's 1955 speech on
Juche (and Korean nationalism) and Rhee's 1904 work on Korean patriotism, the
similarities become obvious:
Once I visited a People's Army vacation home, where a picture of the Siberian
steppe was hung. That landscape probably pleases the Russians. But the Korean
people prefer the beautiful scenery of our own country. There are beautiful
mountains such as Mts. Kumgang-san and Myohyang-san in our country; there
are clear streams, the blue sea with its rolling waves and the fields with ripening
crops. If we are to inspire in our People's Army men a love for their native place
and their country, we must show them many pictures of such landscapes of our
country...
Moreover, there were pictures of huge factories in foreign countries, but there was
not a single one of the factories we were rehabilitating or building. They do not
even put up any diagrams and pictures of our economic construction, let alone
study the history of our country...
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I noticed in a primary school that all the portraits hanging on the walls were of
foreigners such as Mayakovsky, Pushkin, etc., and there were none of Koreans. If
children are educated in this way, how can they be expected to have national
pride? (Kim 1955)13
Our land is located in the temperate zone between the southern ocean and the
northern landmass, and the weather is mild. The soil is rich and productive and
grains and fruits are bountiful. Fish and salt are also plentiful. Deposits of gold,
silver, copper, and iron are buried throughout the country, arousing foreigners'
covetous envy for a long time; if we learn new technology, procure machinery,
and excavate using proper methods, we could build a rich nation by ourselves.
Everywhere, mountains and rivers present unparalleled scenic beauty... With our
remarkable people and rich land, why should we be resigned to being inferior to
other nations? (Rhee 1904)14
Both leaders make detailed references to the physical beauty of Korea and the richness of
its culture in order to instill national pride in a way best suited to their respective regimes.
In North Korea, creating national pride after 1955 escalated from denouncing
foreign influence to denouncing anything foreign altogether; in South Korea, national
pride stemmed from accepting the benefits of foreign influence to maximize the potential
of the Korean landscape and people. In reality, the two states' interpretations of national
pride were not wildly different, but Kim opted to erase the obvious foreign influences on
Juche ideology more to legitimize his authority and justify his absolute rule than to
reinvigorate the North Korean people's sense of ethnic and national identity. Regardless,
Juche proved successful in achieving both causes by synthesizing the two so that national
identity meant absolute loyalty to Kim Il-Sung, the personification of the Korean
revolution.
In Sections II and III, it has been established that the international and domestic
political contexts of the early 20th century created an environment for Juche ideology to
13

Sources of Korean Tradition, Vol II, p420-425

14

Sources of Korean Tradition, Vol II, p299-305
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be introduced in the 1950s and allowed for the successful implementation of it as the
monolithic ideological system of North Korea in the 1960s. Specifically, the destruction
of the Korean War after half a century of subjugation and oppression under Japanese
colonial rule left Koreans with a weakened sense of national pride or unified identity
which could then be expressed through the highly-nationalist Juche ideology. Moreover,
the internal factional strife within North Korea, Kim's weakened legitimacy after the
failure of the Korean War, and his own perceived inferiority and lack of Korean selfidentity, drove him to consolidate his power through ruthless purges of all potential
opponents and establish his thought, and Juche, as the sole acceptable expression of
Korean revolution. Lastly, the de-Stalinization process occurring in socialist states,
especially in the Soviet Union, and the resulting Sino-Soviet split, distanced North Korea
from the socialist internationalist movement and allowed Kim to freely denounce foreign
influences and undermine Soviet and Chinese influence on the formation of the North
Korean state and ideology.
The following section will delve into the cultural and traditional (or, "uniquely
Korean") factors of Juche that granted it legitimacy among the North Korean people, and
also explores the spread of the monolithic ideological system and Kim cult of personality
into all aspects of North Korean society in the 1960s and 1970s.
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Section IV: The Personality Cult
A personality cult is not merely a dictatorship. A personality cult is distinguished from a
dictatorship in that the propagator of a personality cult transcends political dominance.
Hunter (2012) notes that a personality cult is born when the figure at the center of the
personality cult becomes the absolute authority on all aspects of society. A personality
cult does not merely affect, but dominates the daily lives of every citizen in the state and
every decision that is made. Ravine (2011) observes the importance in culture to the
success of a personality cult: "Controlling the culture gives a person control over the
people's mindset by giving his people a pride and national identity on which each person
defines him or herself" (Ravine 2011, 6).
Most authors agree that of the major personality cults in the socialist world, none
has come close to the vastness of the Kim personality cult in North Korea, or has had
such thorough theoretical justifications as those present in Juche. French, in particular,
argues that reforms seen in other socialist states— Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, or
Deng's reconsidering of Mao's decisions, for example— would be impossible in North
Korea, as the personality cult is so entrenched within Korean society that removing it
would result in a total collapse of the state. Unlike other cults of personality, which
mention or celebrate other important figures as allies, such as Zhou Enlai in China or Che
Guevara in Cuba, North Korean official works do not credit anything to anyone other
than Kim Il-Sung. Thus, Juche ideology, and North Korean society as a whole, is
completely defined by the cult of personality of Kim Il-Sung.
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The origins of the personality cult are found within Juche ideology. Helgesen
(1991) notes that, "...In an authoritative textbook on Juche one can be convinced of the
fact that the cult is not an undesirable side effect of a great idea, but a precondition of that
very idea" (Helgesen 1991, 205). Thus, the very existence of Juche depends on absolute
loyalty to the Great Leader, or suryong. Helgesen argues that the concept of Man within
Juche, the master of his own destiny, does not exist as an individual, but as part of the
masses. The masses, then, may only realize their full potential under the guidance of the
leader. Without the leader, the principles of Juche cannot be followed and Man cannot
realize his potential.
Despite this flawless justification, the personality cult around Kim Il-Sung was
first constructed as a response to the uncertainty of the post-Korean war period. As has
been discussed, Kim enacted domestic purges and distanced himself from the
international socialist movement in order to secure his undisputed control over the state,
so that constructing a cult of personality arose from this necessity to secure control.
French notes that "the first decades of the existence of the DPRK saw Kim Il-Sung's
personality cult grow, first to secure power, then to motivate the population, and finally
to dominate the country" (French 2005, 49). In reality, the Soviet Union played a role in
first establishing the cult of personality when selecting Kim as the leader of the new
North Korean state. At this time, before the Korean War, photos of Kim and buildings
named after him were already being erected in North Korea. French quotes a 1945
newspaper article hailing Kim as "the incomparable patriot, national hero, the evervictorious, brilliant field commander with a will of iron... the greatest leader that our
people have known for the last several thousand years" (French 2005, 53).
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Kim would adopt many titles and descriptions, most notably suryong, or Supreme
Leader.15 Other descriptions include, "The great leader Comrade Kim II Sung... the sun
of the nation and the lodestar of the reunification of the fatherland..." (DPRK Const.
Pmbl.), "the leader who unfolded paradise" (Martin 2004, 93) and "peerless patriot,
national hero... the red sun of the oppressed people of the world, the greatest leader of our
time" (Suh 1988, 322). Interestingly, Suh points out that before the Sino-Soviet split and
the mainstreaming of Juche, Kim used to refer to Stalin as suryong of the working people
of the world, and Mao as suryong of the Chinese people (Suh 1988, 316). Kim only
began to call himself suryong after 1967, when Juche ideology and the idea of "selfreliance" began to dominate North Korean thought.
North Korea was founded as a socialist state which prioritized the Korean
Workers' Party before all else, but Juche converted the state into Kim's domain. Kim's
personality cult reached its apex in the 1970s. The new North Korean constitution of
1972, which made Kim president of the republic, symbolized his total dominion over
state and society by this time. The entire Preamble essentially praised Kim as the sole
leader of the Korean revolution and lifeblood of Korean society: "The DPRK Socialist
Constitution is a Kim II Sung constitution which legally embodies Comrade Kim IIung’s Juche state construction ideology and achievements" (DPRK Const. Pmbl.).
Further down the page:
Comrade Kim II Sung was a genius ideological theoretician and a genius art
leader, an ever-victorious, iron-willed brilliant commander, a great revolutionary
and politician, and a great human being. Comrade Kim II ung’s great idea and
achievements in leadership are the eternal treasures of the nation and a
15

Suryong (수령) is essentially a most superlative designation in Korean; no Korean leader prior to Kim IlSung assumed this title or used it to address others.
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fundamental guarantee for the prosperity and efflorescence of the DPRK.
The rest of the 1972 Constitution, including all amendments made to it since, listed his
own ideas as the guiding principles of the state and his revolutionary tradition as the only
tradition of the North Korean people. Suh argues that Kim practiced "not communism in
the so-called socialist state but a peculiar brand of oriental despotism" (Suh 1988, 315).
Evidence of this despotism is found in virtually all aspects of North Korean society.
Absolute obedience to Kim and Juche became the norm in the 1960s and 70s as
dissidence transformed from unacceptable to unimaginable. All mass media, including
art, literature, cinema, and music, served as state propaganda promoting the infallibility
of the suryong. Suh and most other North Korean scholars agree that adulation of Kim in
North Korea often borders on fanaticism. While Kim continued his "on-the-spot
guidance" tours to connect with all levels of his society in the 1960s, these tours
demanded a huge display of grandeur, including large-scale choreographed
demonstrations. The places he visited then became sacred. For his sixtieth birthday in
1972, a massive bronze statue of Kim was erected in Pyongyang along with a marble
museum recounting his heroism in ninety-two exhibitions (Seth 2011, 359). All North
Koreans were (and still are) required to wear a badge with his photo emblazoned on it,
and photos of him were placed in every room of every building. His photograph is
displayed before the national flag and emblem, and countless songs, poems, essays, films,
and stories are dedicated to him. There is even a flower named after him, the Kimilsungia
(Suh 1988, 316). Through the personality cult, justified by Juche, Kim was able to create
successfully a world in which his name was synonymous with the state, where, as Ford
and Kwon (2008) say, "Kim was Korea and Korea was Kim" (48).
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It is not difficult to understand or see the vastness and extremity of the personality
cult surrounding Kim in North Korea. It is difficult, however, to understand how and why
it was successful in North Korea. It is necessary to examine the various aspects of both
indigenous Korean culture and external influences utilized in the creation of the
personality cult to understand why it was implemented successfully in North Korea. One
major reason it was successful was its intrusive nature: manifestations of Juche and
images of Kim are physically present throughout North Korea, especially the capital
Pyongyang, and they are a constant theme in the education, arts, and leisure of North
Korean citizens. Furthermore, the cult of personality employs aspects of Korean culture
and society, including religion, history, and familial relations, to appear legitimate to the
North Korean people.

Pyongyang: The Juche Stage
The capital city of Pyongyang itself exists as a physical expression of Juche and the
personality cult, and, as Kim (2007) notes, a "stage for a narcissistic self-portrait of the
North Korean regime and its leader" (25). She argues that the near-flattening of the city
during the Korean War created a literal empty stage in which any kind of show could be
orchestrated. Although Pyongyang was rebuilt by the painstaking labor and sacrifices of
North Koreans, Kim Il-Sung officially receives the credit. The stage metaphor, if it is
even a metaphor at all, is easily continued, as Kim notes: "His role here is quite
comparable to that of a stage director supervising the construction of the stage set
designed to bear his exalted self-portrait" (33).
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Pyongyang was literally constructed to adhere to the ideology and legitimize the
state. Atkins (1996) sees landscapes in North Korea as "concretised representations of
discourse and continuing participants in that discourse" (2). Kim Il-Sung himself stated
that "Pyongyang must be a model for the whole country in all the ideological, technical
and cultural spheres, so that it can give foreign visitors a complete picture of the
development of our country" (quoted in Atkins 1996, 3). Therefore, the North Korean
state toiled greatly to plan a Pyongyang in which the Juche ideology was perfectly written
and easily read by foreign visitors. The leveling of Pyongyang during the Korean War, as
mentioned, gave the state a unique advantage and opportunity to rebuild the entire city in
its image: "The planners had a tabula rasa on which to write, without the usual
complications of property boundaries which hamper reconstruction under capitalism"
(Atkins 1996, 3).
It may be argued that every building, monument, and road in Pyongyang spells
out Juche and the nationalism propagated by the North Korean regime. Prokopljevic
(2014) notes that, "Supposedly, the architecture created following the Juche idea is based
on shapes and details that match the national taste to such extent, that it is difficult to
evaluate them from a non-Korean point of view" (3). Despite this claim, the urban spaces
of Pyongyang are meant to be admired and understood by both North Koreans and
foreigners. Atkins (1996) provides several examples: the Tower of the Juche Idea,
completed in 1982 to celebrate the seventieth birthday of Kim Il-Sung, was designed to
exceed the height of the Washington Monument by one meter, a seemingly-innocuous
detail which in fact legitimizes (to North Korea) the strength of the Korean regime over
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the United States. Atkins' (1996) further analysis reveals that no detail in Pyongyang is
arbitrary:
The Juche Tower is faced with 70 tiers (one for each year of Kim’s then age) of
25,550 stones (one for each day). On one facade of a pedestal which is fifteen
metres long by four metres high (Kim was born on 15 April) there is a poem in
twelve stanzas (his birth year was 1912) praising his immortal revolutionary feats
and benevolence. Finally, a ‘shrine’ at the base preserves the congratulatory
plaques from juche study groups in seventy countries. (6)
Extraordinary attention to detail in Pyongyang does not assume a passive role in the city
by any means. Quite to the contrary, citizens are encouraged to visit and study its
monuments regularly. Revolutionary sites celebrating the heroic feats of anti-Japanese
revolutionaries and the achievements of the Korean War (called the Fatherland Liberation
War in North Korea) are juxtaposed with parks and other areas of leisure, so the image
and idea of Juche, and in turn Kim Il-Sung, never escape North Koreans.
The imagery present in Pyongyang is, indeed, hyperreal. Kim (2007) and Atkins
(1996) make several references to the performative aspects of the city, where image and
reality blur into one. Joinau (2009) embarks on what he deems a "topo-mythanalysis" of
Pyongyang, in which he attempts to analyze the Juche mythology "carefully written by
the authoritarian North Korean regime in the stones and bricks of Pyongyang" (67).
Joinau's analysis reveals that the ideology is present in the layout of the city. The 75,000
square meter Kim Il-Sung Square was completed in 1954, almost immediately after the
conclusion of the Korean War. The square became the focal point for the regime's
displays of strength and provided a "three-dimensional layout of its ideology" (75). The
massive statue of the legendary Chollima horse, located in the northern part of the city's
central north-south axis, represents the swiftness of economic and social revolution in
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North Korea. Images of Kim Il-Sung abound in Pyongyang, with the most dominant (and
domineering) image, a colossal bronze statue known as the Grand Monument, located in
Mansudae complex in the ideological heart of the city. Mansu signifies "10,000 years"
and refers to Kim's eternal rule over North Korea (76). The Taedong River played an
important role in the layout of the city. According to Joinau (2009), the Tower of the
Juche Idea, along with the Grand People's Study House and the Grand Monument,
created an ideological triangle that signified the city center along the Taedong.
Urban planners in Pyongyang created a city meant to be put on display. The city
is a physical manifestation of Juche and Kim Il-Sung's personality cult; it legitimizes the
regime both to North Koreans and to foreign eyes. It may be argued that this is the only
consideration actually given to Pyongyang residents. Atkins (1996) argues that "The
consumers of landscape are obedient and willing participants, yet they live in a ‘framed’
space in which everyone is an outsider" (8), and Kim (2007) agrees, saying that
Pyongyang exists as an arena for "self-glorification, rather than as functional environs
serving the needs of their inhabitants" (25). The personality cult and Juche in its entirety
may be described the same way.
Actual performances, such as parades and highly-choreographed dances that
occur regularly in Pyongyang, truly denote its status as a stage on which to display and
flaunt the regime's supposed successes, as well as evoke religious loyalty among the
North Korean people. In particular, Jung (2013) argues that the Arirang Festival, a mass
state production of callisthenic and performance arts in Pyongyang, "anchors the Father
[Kim Il-Sung] in both the body and psyche" of the North Korean people and elevates
"Jucheism" to a religious experience for them (Jung 2013, 96). Springer (2003) notes that
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"through such political theatre, the regime creates its own reality" (37). It may be argued
that this reality is projected both inward and outward: outward, to flaunt the regime's
power to the world; inward, to prove to its own people, who suffer constant shortages of
basic goods and countless human rights abuses, that Pyongyang is truly the utopia of
which they are taught. A tangible example is the Ryugyong Hotel. Originally intended to
be the tallest building in the world at 105 stories, construction began in 1989 and only the
exterior was ever completed. The hotel, thus, would appear to serve no practical purpose,
but it serves a theatrical purpose to citizens as the tallest building in the world, a concrete
example of the state's supposed capacity.

Juche as State Religion
The absolutism of the Juche ideology and the worship of Kim Il-Sung, as Kim (2012)
notes, bear a striking resemblance to a fanatical religious cult (Kim 2012, 458). Belke
(1999) notes that Juche is "considerably more than mere nationalism" in North Korea and
that it demands a drastic degree of religiosity from North Koreans. He also notes that
"...Since the lines separating religion and politics are virtually non-existent under Juche,
allegiance to [Kim] is both a sacred religious and a political concept" (Belke 1999, 88).
To this day, Kim Il-Sung is essentially a god in North Korea; he is the country's "Eternal
President" who guided his people along the "road to paradise" (Cumings 1997, 411) and
through Juche is said to have achieved one of the greatest examples of modern thought.
Replacing religious worship in North Korea with worship of Kim through Juche
essentially made Kim a god-like figure who could do no wrong.
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Kim Il-Sung may be thought of as a Christ-like or god-like figure to North
Koreans, or his followers, and it is possible that aspects of Christianity were intentionally
incorporated into the Kim personality cult. Religion and philosophy undeniably
influenced Kim Il-Sung in his youth, as he lived in a Confucian society and belonged to a
Christian family.16 Martin (2004) argues that "Experience in church-related activities
played a considerable role in training one of the most successful mass leaders and
propagandists in the history of the world... for his own eventual elevation to divine
status" (Martin 2004, 12). Several parallels may be drawn between Juche and
Christianity. Belke observes that worship of the suryong includes "standard religious
practices" such as homage, prayer, and unquestioning allegiance (Belke 1999, 84). Statesponsored ceremonies pay homage to the suryong on a grand scale, and individual North
Koreans are expected to bow before Kim's massive bronze statue in Pyongyang and lay
flowers before his tomb in the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, also in Pyongyang. Prayers
at these locations are also common and encouraged by the state in official media (Belke
1999, 87). Mangyongdae, the birthplace of Kim Il-Sung, was designated a "sacred place
similar to Jerusalem or Mecca" to which North Koreans make pilgrimages. (Lim 1982,
275).
The worship within the personality cult is reminiscent of the idea of trinity within
Christianity. The trinity may be perceived in different ways. Cho (2002) notes that "...The
formula of the leader-the party-the masses in the Juche idea is analogous to that of GodChurch (or Christ)-Christians in Christianity" (Cho 2002, 99). This trinity suggests an
intimate relationship between the North Korean people and the state, which was
16

Kim and his parents were part of the Presbyterian community in Korea. After they fled to Manchuria,
they would attend services at a local chapel, where Kim learned to play the organ (Martin 2004, 16).
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encouraged as early as 1955 in Kim Il-Sung's speech introducing Juche. He said, "A party
divorced from the masses is like a fish out of water... Such a party will not only be unable
to win in the revolution, but also will eventually find its very existence endangered" (Kim
1955). Kim emphasized again the intimate relationship between the Party and the people
in a meeting with the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in 1965, using
the metaphor of the Party as mother to the people. He told party members, "Party officials
must become truly people's servants who show motherly concern for their living and
work devotedly in order to improve their lives... to fulfil their responsibility and role as
the workers of a motherly Party... Party officials must have genuine traits of a real
mother" (Kim 1965).
Ryang (2000) argues that the "effeminizing" of North Korean society occurred to
ensure a passive loyalty from the people. The people play a feminine role in returning the
love Kim Il-Sung bestowed upon them. She notes that "North Korean men and women
were “in love” with Kim Il ung, adoring his image, cherishing his figure, admiring his
manly beauty and wisdom, and totally submitting to his command" (Ryang 2000, 341).
This imagery of love between a man and woman may be related to the concept of
identifying the Christian Church as the bride of Christ. The Christian Bible likens the
union of man and woman to the union of the Church (the body of believers) to Christ:
"Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her" (Ephesians 5:25, NRSV). In this
case, we may consider the relationship between Kim Il-Sung and the North Korean
people to be a union of love and sacrifice.
Moreover, the Bible also refers to Christ as head of the church and savior of its
body: "For the husband is the head of the wife just as Christ is the head of the church, the
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body of which he is the Savior" (Ephesians 5:23, NRSV). We may draw a parallel
between this verse and Kim Jong-Il's theory of the socio-political organism. The theory
postulates that the socio-political life of the masses has the potential to be immortal, but
only when joined with the brain (the suryong) and the central nerve (the Party) to create a
socio-political organism that functions as a collective whole (Lim 2008, 64). In relation
to the Bible verse, the husband/Christ (the suryong) is the head (or brain) of the wife/the
church (the masses), and by linking as one socio-political organism, the body (the
masses) achieves immortality, or is saved, through the Savior (the suryong).
The Holy Trinity may be perceived another way in Juche. Rev. Bahn-Suk Lee
argues that "Kim Il-Sung copied and twisted the Christian Trinity... Kim Il-Sung was the
almighty, eternal father; Kim Jong-Il was the active word, the son; and Juche ideology
was the very spirit of the revolution... the life-giving breath of their god" (cited in Belke
2002, xi). This trinity may also be connected to the socio-political organism, in that the
masses may only connect to the suryong through Juche. The work On the Juche Idea
stresses the importance of living through Juche: "All Party members and working people
should clearly understand the truth of the Juche idea, and think and act strictly in
accordance with its requirements" (Kim 1982, 1). Through Juche, the masses may
achieve "ideological consciousness" (Kim 1982, 23) and complete the revolutionary
struggle under the guidance of the suryong. In relating the Juche idea to the Holy Spirit of
Christianity, we may then relate the ideological awakening of the masses to the Christian
Pentecost. The Pentecost, during which the Holy Spirit entered the followers of Christ, is
considered the beginning of the church (or body of believers). Therefore, we may
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consider Juche as the start of the North Korean body of believers who will carry out the
revolution under the father and the son.
The deification of Kim Il-Sung as eternal father and Kim Jong-Il as son were
especially important in legitimizing the succession of power from the former to the latter.
Several legends surround the birth of Kim Jong-Il, created to deify him, and both he and
his mother Kim Jong Suk are credited with healing powers, granting of miracles, and
other superhuman feats similar to those of Jesus Christ (Belke 2002, 305).
North Korean defector Lim Un argues that in North Korea, "There is no
difference in the faith of blind believers toward God in religion. The principle of fidelity
and absolute obedience to a leader is the same as religious commandments" (Lim 1982,
275). In fact, Kim Jong-Il made the monolithic ideological system official in 1974
through the publication of the Ten Principles,17 which bear a striking resemblance to the
Ten Commandments of Christianity. Each of the ten principles emphasizes loyalty to
Kim Il-Sung and mentions him by name. While the principles are vaguer than the
Christian commandments, they essentially provide North Koreans with instructions on
how to live as good North Koreans, as the Ten Commandments are instructions on how
to live as good Christians. North Koreans are expected to know them by heart. The eighth
principle states, "We must value the political life we were given by the Great Leader
comrade Kim Il-sung, and loyally repay his great political trust and thoughtfulness with
heightened political awareness and skill" (quoted in Kim 2008). This principle implies
that Kim Il-Sung, like a god, or a Holy Father, gave life to North Koreans and they owe
him their lives, and also relates back to the theory of the socio-political organism.
17

See Appendix, p.79.
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The idea of a father giving life to the people, Aguirre (2014) argues, is not rare in
personality cults. The figure at the center of a personality cult typically portrays himself
as a venerable father, a paternal figure who gives life to every individual of the state.
Once a personality cult has instilled itself in the identity of a people, the people will act in
accordance to what the figure at the center of the personality cult decrees. Aguirre
describes the paternal aspect of the personality cult as such: "People operate in light of
their identity, that is to say, of their system of values... and if these values gravitate in the
direction of the Fatherly Protector... who rescues us from fear, the people will
consequently respond under this motto: 'That which is good for everyone, is good for me.
And who says which things are good for everyone? Father.'" (Aguirre 2014, 131). The
paternal figure, the object of the personality cult, indisputably knows what is best for his
state and for his children.
The idea of the "fatherly leader" as seen in Juche is also reminiscent of
Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism and can be seen as an extreme version of filial
piety. Seth (2011, 369) observes that leadership in North Korea was portrayed in a
markedly Confucian way: Kim Il-Sung was a benevolent ruler, and society was one large
family exercising constant reciprocal love. The philosophy of Confucianism could be
applied to governing a country as well as familial relations, and it was always "deeply
embedded in the fabric of Korean society" (Kim: 2012, 65). Therefore, it would not have
been difficult for Kim, as a product of this Confucian society, to modify aspects of
Confucianism and apply it to Juche, as it would then appear more familiar and legitimate
to North Korean people.
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Neo-Confucianism was the dominant ideology of the Joseon dynasty. Considered
a revival of classical Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism attempted to remove references
to abstract and religious ideas and solidify the importance of personal morality. Levi
(2012) notes that Neo-Confucianism defines social order "in terms of the harmonious
integration of individuals into a collective whole which present the harmony of the
natural order" (Levi 2012, 5). In Neo-Confucian thought, relationships between
individuals were more hierarchical and based on subordination, and filial piety more
demanding, than in standard Confucian thought. The early Joseon elite of the 14th and
15th centuries reinterpreted Confucianism to protect their interests in a period of strife and
uncertainty. According to Kang (2011), “…the great emphasis on consanguinity on the
one hand and on the other, the obsession with ritual formality and dogmatic ideological
imposition, became the major characteristics of Koreanized neo-Confucianism” (Kang
2011, 67). The emphasis on filial piety and inflexible, dogmatic ideology are easily
identifiable in Juche ideology. Veneration of strong leaders was an important aspect of
Neo-Confucian Joseon society, and this may have carried over into the veneration of Kim
Il-Sung. Harrison (2002) argues that "the built-in readiness of his [Kim Il-Sung's] people
to accept as truth what is dispensed from higher authority made it possible for him to win
widespread voluntary acceptance of his rule" (Harrison 2002, 23). Harrison suggests that
the history of centralized rule in Korea led to voluntary acceptance of the cult of
personality in North Korea because Koreans had not known any type of rule beyond that
of Neo-Confucian Joseon, and Kim Il-Sung continued the traditional type of rule.
As mentioned earlier, Kim Il-Sung himself endorsed Neo-Confucian scholar
Chong Da San (Chong Tasan) and his "splendid works" in his 1955 speech introducing
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Juche. It may be argued that at the time, the mention of Chong only served to underline
Kim's main point that Korean ideology was more important than foreign ideology to
creating a Korean state. Before the spread of the personality cult, Chong Da San's image
was used in North Korea as a symbol of nationalist pride. David-West observes that
North Korean stamps in 1960 displayed both Kim Il-Sung's image and Chong Da San's
image. He argues that these stamps "constituted a political victory statement, saying that
Kim was the inheritor and successor of the great national and cultural traditions of
Korea" (David-West 2011, 97).
Although Da San's image disappeared as the personality cult grew, David-West
argues that the scholar's works were heavily assimilated into Juche. In particular, Da
San's works argue that man is the only being who escapes predetermined rules of nature,
and thus may bend nature to his whims. The Juche idea of "Man" may thus have been
adapted from Da San's works. Da San also wrote of a "benevolent king" or ideal leader,
and David-West connects this to Kim Il-Sung's title of "benevolent leader" (David-West
2011, 109). He also argues that in 1950s North Korea, Da San's philosophy was far more
respected than Kim's idea of Juche, which was hardly a philosophy, and Kim attempted
to assimilate Da San's thoughts into Juche thought to increase its popularity and its
inherent "Korean-ness". According to David-West, "Juche became Stalinism-Tasanism"
(David-West 2011, 104), and this may help to explain why the personality cult was able
to expand within North Korea.
In general, (Neo-) Confucianism was an important aspect of Kim's personality
cult. The image of a "fatherly leader," as mentioned by Aguirre (2014), was central to his
authority and legitimacy. North Koreans were taught to believe that natural life came
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from their biological parents, but social life came from the Great Leader, Kim Il-Sung
(Kim 2012). North Korean propaganda promoted the idea of Kim as a paternal figure,
often showing him in scenes surrounded by smiling children. The scenes symbolized
Kim's rule over the people: the omniscient father wholly committed to the needs of his
grateful, loyal, obedient, and happy children. Citizens bowed before his portrait and gave
thanks to him instead of actual parents. Belke observes that children in school are taught
to place loyalty to the state, and to Kim Il-Sung, above loyalty to their own parents
(Belke 1999, 121). The media emphasized the idea that Kim was a humble, simple, and
doting father, saying: "Comrade Kim Il-Sung, a genius of revolution... has lived his entire
sixty years only for our people's freedom and happiness and the victory of the Korean and
world revolutions" (Cumings 1997, 411). It is worth noting that the image of Kim Il-Sung
was constantly projected in contradictory manners: he was both mundane and a deity,
humble and poorly-educated yet omniscient and omnipotent, on the same level as all
North Koreans but also their Supreme Leader. He was benevolent and doting, but
demanded great sacrifice for little reward.
In terms of the productivity of North Korea, Confucianism was present in the selfsacrificing aspect of Juche. French (2005) notes that family achievement, important in
Confucianism, was "extended to produce a sense of national self-confidence" (38),
especially in the aftermath of the Korean War. Juche demanded that North Koreans
sacrifice personal gratification for the benefit and betterment of the North Korean state,
and mobilization attempts invoked sentiments of Confucian collectivism: "Citizens' rights
and duties are governed by the principle of collectivism, where the individual exists for
the collective, and the collective for the individual" (French 2005, 39). Although Juche

54

does not directly mention Confucius or his teachings, nor does it encourage study of
Confucian thought, Kim Il-Sung himself defended his personality cult by claiming, "We
live by Confucian culture" (French 2005, 40).
Juche was also Confucian in nature because of familism and what Lew, Choi, and
Wang (2013) call "collective representation." Filial piety involves groups rather than
individuals, because those who represent and remember their ancestors exist as a
collective whole. Among Confucian families, collective representation spurs competition
and economic advancement to guarantee successful representation of the ancestors. It
creates a need for family members to "stimulate and supervise each other's secular
performance so that every family member can fulfill their totality of roles and contribute
to collective representation" (Lew, Choi, and Wang 2013, 38).
In North Korea, where society is depicted as one large family, Kim Il-Sung is the
father and the ancestor. Representing and remembering Kim is enacted through direct
actions towards his memory, like bowing to his image, and, more importantly, through
loyalty to the state and to Juche. Jung observes, "Their [North Koreans'] being one is
homage to the Father, whose life was devoted to reviving and raising the Family that is
North Korea" (Jung 2013, 101). French (2005) observes this as well, saying, "Juche
reinforces the concept of a supreme leader using Confucian and Korean traditional
thought to establish the notion of a leader that embodies unity of thought and action. To
question Juche is to question the leader, while loyalty will lead to success" (French 2005,
40). Disobeying Juche is, thus, betraying the ancestor Kim and endangering his eternal
existence, and North Koreans are taught to supervise one another to ensure loyalty in all
levels of society.
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The personality cult surrounding Kim Il-Sung may also have been influenced by
Japanese colonial rule, in particular, kokutai nationalism, that was imposed on the Korean
peninsula.18 Fridell observes that, "...Within the central institutional system, all
institutions were seen as units of a pyramiding family-state, or family-nation... over
which the emperor presided as the supreme national father-figure..." and that "...filial
piety extended to the national level found its highest expression in emperor-loyalty"
(Fridell 1976, 550). Emperor-loyalty, or emperor-worship, was expected of Koreans
under Japanese colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century. Harrison (2002)
notes this bears a "striking resemblance" to loyalty to the suryong in Juche, and it is
possible that Kim Il-Sung maintained this remnant of Japanese colonial rule within the
cult of personality because the framework of the practice was already established in
Korea at the time.

The Deification of the Kims
Kim Il-Sung's personality cult eventually encompassed his entire family and created the
"Kim dynasty." To ensure his larger-than-life image would prevail even after his death,
Kim Il-Sung named his son, Kim Jong-Il, the successor to rule of North Korea.
Furthermore, as Ford and Kwon (2008) note, Kim Il-Sung was driven to choose a direct
successor to guarantee the continuation of his work after witnessing the betrayal of Stalin
and Mao in the Soviet Union and China. Kim Jong-Il would prevent any attempts to "deKimilsung" North Korea; in fact, he would achieve quite the opposite. Aguirre (2014)
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Kokutai nationalism, which Fridell also refers to as "Shinto nationalism" or "State Shinto" (Fridell 1976,
548), is specifically related to the period in Japanese imperial history (1868-1945) during which the
Japanese state used Shinto elements to mobilize loyalty.
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notes that leaders of personality cults "Attempt to transcend death... by way of the
perpetuation of the revolutionary myth and the attainment of political utopia which they
embody" (Aguirre 2014, 249), and Kim Il-Sung perpetuated his own revolutionary myth
through the addition of his family. Statues and shrines honoring the Kim family joined
those of Kim Il-Sung throughout the country.
It can be argued that the personality cult, and indeed Juche, was created and
propagated to secure Kim Jong-Il's control of power. Lacking the charisma and
revolutionary guerrilla background of his father, Kim Jong-Il relied on the deification of
his family and the myth-making of Juche to legitimize his rule over North Korea. Kim's
only true claim to legitimacy, despite the many titles bestowed upon him, was his role in
expanding the role of Juche and the personality cult in North Korea. Kim Jong-Il was
credited as the author of the most comprehensive publication on Juche ideology, On the
Juche Idea, delivered as a Treatise to the National Seminar on the Juche Idea in 1982.
French notes that Kim had "...no background in the military, as a political theorist or as
an economist, yet as the interpreter of Juche he accrued power" (French 2005, 44). He
climbed the ranks of the North Korean elite in the 1970s and 80s and he was officially
designated heir in 1980; therefore, his influence in the myth-making of Juche and
deifying of the Kim family may have been quite large while Kim Il-Sung was still in
power.
In order to legitimize the leadership of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, and elevate
them to god-like status, the personality cult dictated a complete rewriting of Korean
history. Modern Korean history became a celebration of the Kim family's achievements.
North Korean historians attempted to rewrite all of Korean history to fit the current ruling
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ideology. As Ch'oe says, North Korean history was specifically written to "glorify the
uniqueness of Korea's historical legacies in order to satisfy the particularistic ego of
nationalism" (Ch'oe 1981, 503). Lintner notes that North Korean historians traced Kim's
ancestry back twelve generations and added a great deal of embellishments and
exaggerations to feats that may or may not have been carried out by members of the Kim
family (Lintner 2005, 77). Kim's own history, which as mentioned is vague at best, has
been filled with rich details. Details that contradict the idea of "self-reliance" have been
omitted: Kim's Chinese education and youth in Manchuria has been erased from his
personal history, and official references to Marxism-Leninism have largely vanished.
North Korea's version of history views the modern period as a national struggle
against foreign aggression, and members of Kim Il-Sung's family naturally played the
predominant role. One instance is a particularly important example of the Korean
people's resistance to U.S. imperialism: the sinking of the U.S. merchant ship General
Sherman near Pyongyang in 1866. North Korean scholars inserted Kim Ung-U, Kim IlSung's great-great-grandfather, into the history, claiming he led the attack on the ship.
Burdick (2010) notes that Kim Ung-U's role in sinking the ship was not added to North
Korean official history until the 1980s, and was inserted to prove Kim Il-Sung's merit as
a revolutionary leader through heredity and genetics— not coincidentally around the
same time that Kim Jong-Il was preparing to be his father's successor. North Korean
historians later inserted Kim Il-Sung's father, Kim Hyong-jik, in the March First
Movement of 1919, evident in a North Korean history textbook calling him "...the great
and eminent leader of our nation's anti-Japanese people's movement..." (Hart 2000, 153),
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and claiming that six-year-old Kim Il-Sung also participated. Ch'oe argues that these
claims "are totally new and unfamiliar to the outside world" (Ch'oe 1981, 520).
Most important to legitimizing the succession of Kim Jong-Il was the deification
of his mother, Kim Il-Sung's first wife, Kim Jong Suk. Propaganda celebrating Kim Jong
Suk first appeared in the late 1960s. Ryang argues that Kim Jong Suk became the most
important role model for Korean women around the time that Kim Jong-Il, her son, was
preparing to take over leadership of North Korea from his father Kim Il-Sung. Belke
(1999) argues "...since Kim Jong-Il does not have any basis for being god, deifying Kim
Jong Suk adds to his credibility... Thus, the recent reinvention of Kim Jong Suk is, at its
core, the calculated use of [Juche] to bolster Kim Jong Il's legitimacy..." (Belke 1999,
73). Elevating her position in the North Korean mythology legitimized the dynastic
succession of father to son in the leadership. According to Park, Kim Jong Suk's
"achievements during the revolutionary period have been praised in newspapers,
publications by the Democratic Women's Union, commentaries by the Central
Broadcasting Station, poems, songs, and slogans such as 'Learn from Comrade Kim Jong
Suk'" (Park 1992, 28). She is an important figure in the North Korean mythology because
she represents and personifies the anti-Japanese struggle, sacrifice in the name of the
state, and undying loyalty to Kim Il-Sung.
According to Park (1992), and to her own biography, Kim Jong Suk was one of
the few women revolutionary fighters in the anti-Japanese struggle of the 1930s. Her
entire family succumbed to harsh conditions or brutality from Japanese officials,
inspiring her to join the revolutionary movement at a young age. Her biography states
"Kim Jong Suk began to realize, already in her childhood, the nature of the contradictions
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of the exploitative society that brought her misery and sorrow. She felt hatred for the
Japanese imperialists and her class enemies." Of course, the wording strongly suggests
that Kim Jong Suk was drawn to socialist ideas, or even the beginnings of Juche ideas,
from a young age, simply through her everyday ordeals rather than through education or
exposure to these ideas.
The biography clearly serves to bolster the images of both Kim Il-Sung and Kim
Jong-Il. Kim Jong Suk had three children and passed away during childbirth in 1949;
however, her official biography omits these details, focusing solely on Kim Jong-Il. Her
biography in its entirety reveals very little about Kim Jong Suk's character or personality;
the only image projected of her portrays a woman entirely devoted to, first, the
revolutionary struggle, and later, the welfare of Kim Il-Sung and in turn, of the new
Korean state.
Kim Il-Sung, in his autobiography19 With the Century, very clearly states that Kim
Jong Suk's most important role and contribution was being mother to Kim Jong-Il:
If there is any heritage she left with us, it is that she brought up Comrade Kim
Jong Il to be the leader of the future, and presented him to the motherland and the
Party. You say I brought him up to be my successor, but in actual fact the
foundation was laid by Kim Jong Suk. This is the greatest service she rendered for
the revolution." (Kim 2003, 1852-1853)
Although Kim Jong-Il was born in Siberia in 1942, (Suh 1988, 51), official North Korean
history states that he was born on Mt. Paekdu, a sacred site in ancient Korean mythology
and the supposed birthplace of the founder of Korea, Tangun. Belke notes, "...The
concocted lore of Kim Jong-Il being born on Mt. Paekdu of Kim Il-Sung (a god) and Kim
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"Autobiography" is used loosely here. Defector and former North Korean official Hwang Jang-Yop
claims that the autobiography had been "created by artists who had been writing scenarios for revolutionary
novels and films" and calls it a "masterpiece of historical fabrication" (quoted in Martin 2004, 12).

60

Jong Suk (a goddess) recalls the ancient Tangun legend..." (Belke 1999, 73). The
incorporation of ancient legend further served to deify the new leader, Kim Jong-Il.

Korean Historiography
The personality cult of Kim Il-Sung and his family was successfully established and
reached extreme levels of profundity because it catered to a uniquely Korean worldview,
which had been shaped by Korean history and rocked by Japanese colonial rule and the
Korean War. All aspects of the personality cult are reminiscent of aspects of Korean
culture and history. As Seth (2011) notes, "... [Self-sufficiency in] North Korea was
carried out with such a particular urgency that, coupled with the country's isolation, its
authoritarian ruthlessness, and its ultranationalism, gave it a unique quality" (Seth 2011,
357).
The Korean War was only one tragedy of many for Koreans in recent history.
The principle of sadae, or serving the superior China, adopted by the Joseon dynasty
(1392-1897), its various conflicts with Japan and the Western world, and the period of
Japanese colonial rule were considered humiliating to Koreans in the mid-twentieth
century (Seth 2011). Koreans saw these events as past weaknesses and collective national
failure. Perhaps also from a Confucian perspective, Koreans viewed these events as
examples of poor governance, similarly to the Confucian tradition of viewing prior rulers'
actions as a mirror for current governance (Schultz 2004). The discontentment and
humiliation from these historical episodes was only amplified by the destruction brought
about in part by the United States during the Korean War. Juche as an ideology and
worldview grew in power and influence in the years following the Korean War partly
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because North Koreans did not wish to repeat the errors of their past, especially those
wrought by foreign influence on the Korean peninsula.
The complete rewriting of Korean history to suit the Juche ideology was also
possible because of the longstanding Korean tradition of historiography. Hart (2000)
argues that Korean national identity is based on two ideas: "National history is both
eternal (history is an unfolding story with today as the logical arrival point) and natural
(we are who we are because it is our essential character to be)" (Hart 2000, 138), and
Korean historiography has always catered to these ideas. Therefore, rewriting history
with the teleological intent of justifying Juche makes it appear as the only logical step in
the continuing history of Korea. Even before Japanese colonial rule, the Korean peninsula
had seen many versions of its own history written and rewritten to suit the needs of the
current ruling dynasty. Korean historiography was important to reaffirming the
uniqueness of the Korean people, especially during times of struggle and subjugation.
After Japanese colonial rule had ended, various versions of Korean history
existed. The Japanese version stressed the Koreans' cultural inferiority and limited the
vastness of its ancient dynasties (Kim 2012, 353), while nationalistic histories from the
same period sought to refute and discredit Japanese historiography and stress the
importance of the struggle for Korean independence. These histories were thus further
divided between nationalists with communist leanings and those without. With such a
large array of historiographies existing in Korean history, especially in the period directly
before Kim Il-Sung's rule, it is not difficult to understand how North Korea was able to
completely rewrite Korean history with relative ease.
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Moreover, as Confucian historiographers of the ancient dynasties used historical
accounts to bolster the power of the current ruler and reflect on the errors of past rulers,
North Korean historiography also utilizes Korean history to legitimize its regime. North
Korea, despite calling itself Joseon (Choson), actually denounced the Joseon dynasty for
its weaknesses, mainly its feudalistic class structures and debilitating interactions with the
outside world. It emphasizes a stark difference between the feudal era of Joseon and the
modern period of Joseon, which is North Korea under Juche.
Despite North Korea's official denunciation of the Joseon dynasty, much of Kim
Il-Sung's ideology may find its roots in Joseon thinking (Kim 2012, 320). The idea of the
"Kim dynasty" in itself draws from the long dynasties of Korea's past, Joseon being the
longest, and the Neo-Confucian social order present in Joseon is present in North Korea,
especially in loyalty to a single ruler of the state. North Korea may have adopted the
Joseon name for several reasons. Since the dynasty ruled for nearly five hundred years
before falling to Japanese colonial rule, the North Korean government was able to assert
its legitimacy by claiming to be a direct continuation of Joseon and erasing the period of
Japanese colonial rule. Levi (2012) notes that the dynastic succession was a logical step
for Kim because he had created the perception of North Korea as a continuation of the
Joseon dynasty to erase the prewar era of subjugation under Japanese colonial rule.
Joseon was a strictly Confucian state in which dynastic succession was a rule.
Therefore, Kim decided to adhere to the established rules of an earlier Korea, which also
granted his regime more legitimacy in that in connected itself to a largely successful,
independent period of Korea's past. Through calling itself Joseon, North Korea also
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celebrates its ancestry in the very foundation of the Korean people— the Gojoseon20—
and, in turn, asserts its legitimacy by connecting itself to the ancient history of the
peninsula. As mentioned, references to the founder of Korea and the Gojoseon, Tangun,
abound in North Korean texts, especially to connect Kim Jong-Il to the sacred and
legendary history of Korea.
Having considered the various cultural influences, both indigenous and foreign,
on the personality cult, we may better understand why it was successful in North Korea.
The indigenous influences on the cult of personality, in particular the aspects of
Christianity and Korean Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, in combination with
foreign influences such as other socialist cults of personality and Japanese emperorworship, bolstered the legitimacy of Juche to the North Korean people and presented
them with an ideology that did not appear particularly foreign to them. Rather, the
"Korean-ness" of Juche and the cult of personality appealed to Koreans who had spent
much of recent history subjugated by foreign powers. Genuine admiration for Kim IlSung, given his charisma and nationalist guerrilla background, allowed the personality
cult to expand profoundly. Contrastingly, ruthless purges of perceived opposition, brutal
tactics of suppressing dissent, and complete state control over virtually all types of
information also allowed the cult of personality to expand.

20

Exact dates of the Gojoseon kingdom are unknown. The legend of Tangun has the foundation of Korea
occurring in 2333 BC, though no evidence exists to support this. The kingdom is estimated to have fallen in
108 BC (Kim 2012).
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The Personality Cult and Isolationism
One final consideration for the successful implementation and expansion of the cult of
personality in North Korea is its degree of isolationism. Kim (2012) describes historical
Korea as a "single homogeneous nation that has kept its identity despite repeated
invasions by surrounding countries and peoples" (Kim 2012, xi) and argues that it
maintained a degree of isolationism as a form of self-preservation in the face of countless
invasions. The Joseon dynasty in particular received the name "The Hermit Kingdom"
after closing itself off to foreign influence. Contemporary North Korea is also often
referred to as "The Hermit Kingdom." As has been discussed in this thesis, despite the
demand for "self-reliance" through Juche, Kim Il-Sung hardly practiced international
isolationism. The foreign influences on Juche alone contradict its claims of being entirely
indigenous and "uniquely Korean." Kim's dependence on the Soviet Union and China
also contradicts the main tenets of Juche ideology. However, a degree of isolationism still
existed (and exists) in North Korea, and this allowed Kim Il-Sung and later Kim Jong-Il
to reign as kings over the state.
Turku (2009) defines isolationist foreign policy as combining "a noninterventionist military posture with an ideological, social, and political agenda of statecentric economic nationalism and protectionism" (Turku 2009, 6). Protectionism is
perhaps the most important aspect of the Juche ideology. Indeed, Juche existed to
"protect" the Korean people from foreign aggression and can be considered a form of
domestic isolationism, meant to exalt the formerly-oppressed Korean people. In Kim
Jong-Il's On the Juche Idea, he states:
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Koreans must know well Korean history, geography, economics, culture and the
custom of the Korean nation, and in particular our Party's policy, its revolutionary
history and revolutionary traditions. Only then will they be able to establish Juche
and become true Korean patriots, the Korean communists. In order to establish
Juche in thinking, it is necessary to possess a high sense of national dignity and
revolutionary pride. Without the sense of national pride that one's nation is
inferior to none, without the pride and honour of the revolutionary people, it
would be impossible to live up to one's conviction in an independent manner,
uphold national independence and dignity and emerge victorious in the difficult
revolutionary struggle.
Therefore, Juche may only be successful if the Korean people are well-versed in their
own culture and history (naturally including the "revolutionary traditions" of Kim IlSung) and if they truly believe that their nation is "inferior to none." Nationalism is a
requirement in Juche, and the isolationist nature of Juche exists to foster that nationalism
and to ensure the "independence" of the people from foreign influences.
Its geographical location in addition to the international political context of the
1950s-1970s undoubtedly played a role in the growth of the personality cult. The Korean
peninsula maintained a degree of isolation from the rest of the world for much of its
history because of its geographical location. Its interactions with foreign powers were
largely limited to China and Japan, both of which mounted several invasion attempts on
Korea, and Korea had virtually no exposure to the Western world until the sixteenth
century (Kim 2012, 274). During the 1950s to 1970s, North Korea had little to no
interaction with South Korea and with the rest of the democratic world. Turku (2009)
argues that North Korea was isolationist partly because it chose to be isolationist and
partly because the international community, led by the United States, chose not to interact
and cooperate with it due to its totalitarian nature (Turku 2009, 15).
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According to Kim, Juche represents "the independent stance of rejecting
dependence on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and
displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance" (Kim 1975, 117). Juche was, at its
core, isolationist. However, North Korea has maintained diplomatic relations with many
states, including China, which has been its biggest ally and trade supporter since the
Korean War. Kim Il-Sung had alliances with several socialist rulers throughout Eastern
Europe and outheast Asia, and his leadership style inspired Nicolae Ceauşescu,
communist dictator of Romania, to adopt his own personality cult. Therefore, domestic
isolationism was always more crucial than international isolationism in maintaining the
Kim regime in North Korea. The inherent contradictions of Juche ideology are not
apparent to North Koreans, who are exposed only to information carefully censored by
the state.
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Section V: Conclusion
This thesis has attempted to answer the questions of why and how Juche ideology and the
cult of personality were successfully implemented in North Korea. The thesis undertook a
historical analysis of the formation of the North Korean state, including the international
and domestic context of this formation. It has concluded that Juche was successfully
implemented and institutionalized due to several factors, including the rise of Korean
nationalism, the personal history of founder Kim Il-Sung, the Korean War and the
resulting domestic strife, the international political context of this time, and the nature of
Korean culture. This thesis has provided a history and explanation of Juche ideology,
which in turn is necessary for understanding North Korea as a whole.
This thesis has served to synthesize the many different approaches and arguments
on Juche ideology into one comprehensive, coherent, and multifaceted analysis of the
different factors that contributed to the creation of the Juche ideology. It has also
enriched the overall discussion on Juche by presenting several original analyses of the
formation of Juche ideology. Specifically, a juxtaposition of Kim Il-Sung's and Rhee
Syngman's works on nationalism and Korean-ness highlighted the similarities and
differences in their approaches to defining Korean national identity. The detailed
comparison of aspects of the personality cult to verses from the Bible, and other aspects
of Christianity, including the Holy Trinity and the Pentecost, demonstrated the religious
aspect of Juche. These comparisons stress the striking similarities between Juche and
Christianity and support the argument that, given the context of his Christian upbringing,
Kim Il-Sung may have assimilated Christianity into his cult of personality. This thesis
also applied Turku's concept of "domestic isolationism" directly to Juche to analyze how
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the absolute state control over the domestic sphere allowed the regime to act in
inconsistent matters and allowed Juche to function as an inherently contradictory
ideology.
Understanding Korean history is crucial to understanding Kim Il-Sung's Juche
ideology. Korea's encounters with the outside world since the late 19th century were
largely negative. The birth of Korean nationalism among the homogeneous Korean
population before and during the years of Japanese colonial rule contributed to the desire
to find or create a national self-identity. Korea faced severe subjugation and dominance
under Japanese colonial rule, followed by the division of the peninsula and the Korean
War, which devastated the northern half. North Koreans at this time had no sense of
national pride or identity. The "uniquely Korean" aspects of Juche, as well as the concept
of self-reliance and rejection of foreign influence, catered to North Koreans at this time.
The Korean War also created factional strife within the North Korean leadership.
Kim Il-Sung, who had lost the war, acted quickly to blame his failures on others to secure
control over the state. Originally part of the Kapsan faction of revolutionary Koreans,
Kim used factional differences to his advantage, and by the end of the 1950s, successfully
purged most of his opponents from the leadership circle. He consolidated his power and
introduced the concept of Juche, or self-reliance, in 1955, using the idea to blame factions
for depending blindly on Soviet or foreign thought without relying on Korean thought.
Kim would not fully develop the idea of Juche until the late 1960s. He was careful
to avoid the concept of "self-reliance" while still reliant on Soviet and Chinese aid. He
skillfully used the Sino-Soviet split to his advantage to continue receiving aid from both
states without declaring a side. After the death of Stalin in 1956 and the ensuing de-
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Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union, Kim began to distance himself from his
former allies and the people who had originally put him into power in North Korea. Once
Chinese aid to North Korea slowed in the mid-1960s, Kim began to develop the idea of
Juche, and it became the main slogan for North Korean propaganda.
North Korea's rivalry with South Korea after the Korean War was also an impetus
for the development of Juche ideology. Both states sought to project the sole image of
"Korean-ness" to the world and did not acknowledge the existence of two separate
Korean states. Kim Il-Sung's mistrust of anticommunist South Korean President Rhee
Syngman was evident in his 1955 speech introducing Juche. Rhee's denunciation of
communism as a break from tradition, especially in Korea, prompted Kim to develop
Juche as a specifically-Korean ideology to demonstrate that North Korea was more
connected to Korean tradition than South Korea.
The cult of personality resulting from Juche ideology was taking shape in North
Korea as early as 1948. The Soviet Union planted its seeds by encouraging hyperbolic
propaganda and newspaper articles on Kim Il-Sung to legitimize his rule to skeptical
North Koreans. It expanded in profundity after the Korean War, while Kim was working
to consolidate his power and silence all dissidence. All channels of information were
controlled by the state and became outlets to spread the infallible and god-like nature of
Kim. Kim's revolutionary struggle and traditions became the sole traditions of North
Korean history, and his family was written into the revolutionary history of the peninsula.
The deification of Kim through the personality cult may be a result of his own
perceived weaknesses and shortcomings. Having grown up in Manchuria speaking
Chinese, Kim may have perceived himself as less Korean than other potential leaders,
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and sought to compensate by exaggerating the nationalistic aspects of Juche ideology. A
son to peasants, Kim was not well-educated and subsequently not well-versed in classic
thought as had many other Korean factional leaders of the time. He may have felt inferior
to and threatened by them, and decided to enact purges against anyone and everyone he
considered suspicious. Lankov (2002) argues that Kim Il-Sung's actual feats as a
revolutionary guerrilla fighter and his intelligence and quick-wittedness exemplified in
his leadership have been devalued by the excessive embellishments of the personality cult
and the brutal manners in which the regime enforces it.
North Korean defector Lim Un claims that the extreme reliance on Juche stems
from Kim Il-Sung's desire to be taken seriously as a theoretician or ideologist, which he
shared with Mao. Specifically, Lim quotes from the memoirs of Wang Ming, a leader in
the CCP, a conversation between Wang and Mao regarding Mao's desire to create his
own "ism." His reasoning is: "If a leader fails to establish his own 'ism,' he is liable to be
overthrown by others, or attacked after his death. But once an 'ism' is established, the
situation is different..." (quoted in Lim 1982, 268). Lim argues that the personality cult
within North Korea was not enough to satisfy Kim; rather, he wished for Juche to be
acknowledged universally as the supreme ideology of the time. David-West (2011)
agrees that Kim felt inferior to the great thinkers of Korean history and thus assimilated
their philosophies with his ideology to develop Juche into a theory applicable to all
aspects of North Korean society.
Stemming from his perceived inferiority and desire to leave a legacy, the
personality cult was also used to justify the transmission of power from Kim Il-Sung to
his son Kim Jong-Il. Having witnessed the process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union
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and the reconsiderations of Mao's policies in China, Kim feared the betrayal of his own
policies in North Korea and thus chose Kim Jong-Il as his successor to ensure the
continuation of Juche. Kim Jong-Il, even before being chosen as successor, was
influential in institutionalizing Juche and the cult of personality. He is author of the
seminal work on Juche, On the Juche Idea, and was considered the leading specialist on
Juche in North Korea. The deification of Kim, and later his family, was also useful in
legitimizing Kim Jong-Il's own rule, since he lacked the revolutionary background and
traits of a charismatic leader of his father.
The cult of personality was successfully implemented in North Korea because
North Koreans both admired Kim Il-Sung and were forced to admire him. The
personality cult combined several aspects of Korean culture and history, therefore
appearing indigenous and connected to the patterns of Korean history and making it more
accessible or believable to the North Korean people. Specifically, it utilized aspects of
Christianity, Confucianism, and Neo-Confucianism to create the concept of Kim Il-Sung
as an immortal and benevolent father-figure to whom North Koreans owed their political
lives. Since Juche blurred the lines between politics and society, North Koreans
essentially owed their entire existence to Kim, and were taught to treasure the fatherly
leader over their own parents. Worship of Kim and endless monuments, songs, poems,
films, and performances praising him elevated him to a status of god-like creator and
savior of the Korean people, and by the late 1970s, Juche resembled a state religion more
than a political ideology.
State control of all information and all aspects of life in North Korean society
ensured the legacy of Kim Il-Sung would never falter. As Ford and Kwon (2008) note,
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Kim became synonymous with North Korea. French (2005) argues that the cult of
personality is so deeply embedded into North Korean society that it would be impossible
to remove it without causing the entire society to collapse. The rigidity of Juche has
prevented any flexibility or reform within the North Korean state and caused it to
stagnate in all aspects of production.
Juche first granted North Koreans a sense of self-identity and national pride
because it claimed to be "uniquely Korean" and catered to "the unique Korean
worldview." Juche takes advantage of Korea's historical isolationism through the "selfreliance" stance. It also postulates that interaction with the outside world could yield no
benefits, with Japanese colonial rule, the Korean War, and foreign imperialism as
evidence. Juche manipulated Korean history in favor of the North Korean elite, retaining
the ideas of dynastic succession, isolationism, and absolute loyalty to the leader, and
discarding anything that would not fit into the North Korean hagiography.
Juche elevated Korean nationalism into hypernationalism. Juche promoted the
purity of the Korean people and xenophobia towards any other peoples. Juche functioned
as what Turku calls "domestic isolationism" in that it focused inward rather than
outwards. Under the framework of the world as an imperialistic threat, Juche could serve
as a form of protectionism for the North Korean people, controlling all information for
their own benefit. The guise of domestic isolationism and Juche protectionism allowed
for endless contradictions in North Korean foreign and domestic policy.
Ultimately, Juche was made the dominant ideology of North Korea to perpetuate
Kim Il-Sung's regime and personality cult. Juche was ingrained into the very fabric of
North Korean society so that Kim's words were law and opposing him was unfathomable,
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as it would be the equivalent of opposing all of Korean history and the struggles of the
Korean ethnicity. Juche made Kim Il-Sung synonymous with North Korea and allowed
his figure to surpass his actual life. Juche and Kim's personality cult have persisted in
North Korea despite significant changes in the international field, though a lasting future
under Kim's regime in North Korea seems precarious at best.
This thesis is useful in understanding how North Korea operates as a Jucheist
rather than communist state. Understanding Juche extends to understanding past, present,
and future North Korean policy decisions. Furthermore, as Turku (2009) argues, domestic
isolationism is impossible to maintain in today's interconnected and interdependent
world. Considering isolationism bolstered the intensity of Kim's personality cult, the
world is not likely to see the rise of any similar personality cults in the near future.
Juche is vital in understanding the future of the North Korean regime. Ultimately,
the “self-reliance” of Juche translates to reliance upon Kim Il-Sung. Having endured for
over sixty years, outliving other socialist states and surviving the Cold War because of
Juche, the future of the North Korean regime depends on its adherence to the Juche
ideology. Specifically, how current leader Kim Jong Un, grandson of Kim Il-Sung,
utilizes Juche will determine the survival of the regime. Whether he continues to uphold
Kim Il- ung’s legacy as his father did, or reinterpret Juche to suit his own desires, will be
the deciding factor of the future of the North Korean regime. At this time, it appears that
the young leader Kim has opted to distance himself from the past; his 2017 new year’s
address made no mention of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, or even suryong (Cha 2017). This
spells an uncertain future for a country that has virtually functioned as a Jucheist state
under Kim Il- ung’s words since its formation.

74

Bibliography
Aguirre, Pedro Arturo. 2014. Historia mundial de la megaloman : Desmesuras,
s
os
n s s
u o
son i
n o i . Ebook ed.
M xico, D.F.: Debate Editorial.
Armstrong, Charles K. 2004. The North Korean Revolution: 1945-1950. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Belke, Thomas J. 1999. Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea's State Religion.
Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Book Company.
Burdick, Eddie. 2010. Three Days in the Hermit Kingdom: An American Visits North
Korea. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Cha, Du-Hyeong. "Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Day speech: What did we learn?" NK
News - North Korea News. January 02, 2017.
Cheong, Seong-Chang. 2000. "Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of
Ideology and Power." Asian Perspective 24, no. 1: 133-61.
Cho, Eunsik. 2002. "The Encounter between the Juche Idea and Christianity." Mission
Studies 19, no. 1: 82-105.
Ch'oe, Yong-ho. 1981. "Reinterpreting Traditional History in North Korea." The Journal
of Asian Studies 40, (3) 503-523.
Ch oe, Y ng-ho, Peter H. Lee, and De Bary William Theodore. 2000. Sources of Korean
Tradition: Volume II: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Cotton, James, and Ian Neary. 1989. The Korean War in History. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities International. Print.
Cumings, Bruce. 1997. Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W.W.
Norton.
David-West, Alzo. 2011. "Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the
Case of Ch ng Tasan." Korean Studies 35, no. 1: 93-121.
D.P.R.K Const. Preamble.
Ford, Glyn, and Soyoung Kwon. "Kim's Korea." In North Korea On the Brink: Struggle
For Survival. London: Pluto Press, 2008.
Fridell, Wilbur M. 1976. "A Fresh Look at State Shinto." Journal of the American
Academy of Religion XLIV, no. 3: 547-61.
French, Paul. 2005. North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula. New York: Zed Books.

75

Han, Hongkoo. 2013. "Colonial Origins of Juche: The Minsaengdan Incident of the
1930s and the Birth of the North Korea-China Relationship." In Origins of North
Korea's Juche, edited by Jae-Jung Suh, 33-63. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Hart, Dennis. 2000. "Proclaiming Identity, Claiming The Past: National Identity and
Modernity in North and South Korean Education." Asian Perspective, 24, 3:
135-58.
Harrison, Selig S. 2003. "The Confucian Legacy." In Korean Endgame: A Strategy for
Reunification and U.S. Disengagement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Helgesen, Geir. 1991. "Political Revolution in A Cultural Continuum: Preliminary
Observations On the North Korean "Juche" Ideology with Its Intrinsic Cult Of
Personality." Asian Perspective 15, no. 1: 187-213.
Hunter, Sarah Gail. 2012. "Love and Exploitation: Personality Cults, Their
Characteristics, Their Creation, and Modern Example." Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press.
Joinau, Benjamin. 2014. The Arrow and the Sun: A Topo-mythanalysis of Pyongyang.
Sungkyun Journal of Asian Studies, 14(1), 65-92.
Jung, Hyang Jin. 2013. "Jucheism as an Apotheosis of the Family: The Case of the
Arirang Festival." Journal of Korean Religions 4, no. 2: 93-122.
Kang, Jin Woong. 2011. "Political Uses of Confucianism in North Korea." The Journal
of Korean Studies 16, no. 1: 63-87.
Kihl, Young Whan. 1994. "The Cultural Dimension and Context of North Korean
Communism." Korean Studies 18, no. 1: 139-57.
Kim, Ch ng-il. Our socialism centered on the masses shall not perish: talk to the Senior
Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea May 5, 1991.
Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2003.
Kim, Gwang-Oon. 2013. "The Making of the Juche State in Postcolonial North Korea."
In Origins of North Korea's Juche, edited by Jae-Jung Suh, 63-89. Lanham:
Lexington Books.
Kim, Il-Sung. 2003. With the Century. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
Kim, Il-Sung. 1975. For the Independent, Peaceful Reunification of Korea. New York:
International Publishers.

76

Kim, Il-Sung. "Look after the people in a responsible manner as a mother would do with
her children." Address, A Talk to the Officials of the Organizational Leadership
Department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and
Pyongyang City, North Korea, Pyongyang, February 15, 1965.
Kim, Jinwung. 2012. A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States
in Conflict. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Kim, J.I. 2008. Constructing a "Miracle," Architecture, National Identity and
Development of the Han River. A Critical Exploration of Architecture and
Urbanism: Seoul, 1961 -1988. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of California,
Berkeley.
Kim, Jong-Il. 1990. "Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied
by the Juche idea." Speech, Speech Delivered to the Senior Officials of the
Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Pyongyang.
Kim, Jong-Il, and Il-Sung. Kim. 1982. On the Juche Idea: treatise sent to the National
Seminar on the Juche Idea, held to mark the 70th birthday of the great leader
comrade Kim Il Sung, March 31, 1982. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publ.
House.
Kim Jong Suk: Biography. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2002.
Kim, Hyun-Sik. 2008. "Reflections on North Korea: The Psychological Foundation of
the North Korean Regime and its Governing Philosophy." International Bulletin
of Missionary Research 32, no. 1: 22-26.
Kim, Suk-Young. (2007). Springtime for Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang: City On Stage,
City as Stage. TDR/The Drama Review, 51(2), 24-40.
Kim, Uichol, and Young-Shin Park. 2005. "Perception of American People, Society, and
Influence: Psychological, Social, and Cultural Analysis of Anti-American
Sentiments in South Korea." In Korean Attitudes toward the United States:
Changing Dynamics, edited by David I. Steinberg, 247-265. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe.
Lankov, Andrei. N. 2002. From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea,
1945-1960. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Lee, Chong-Sik. 1963. The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.

77

Lew, Seok-Choon, Woo-Young Choi, and Hye Suk Wang. 2013. "Confucian Ethics and
the Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: The Significance of Filial Piety." In The Korean
Economic Developmental Path: Confucian Tradition, Affective Network. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lim, Jae-Cheon. 2009. Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea. London: Routledge.
im, n. 1982. The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of
i
-sŏn . Tokyo: Jiy -sha.
Lintner, Bertil. 2005. Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the
Kim Clan. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books.
Martin, Bradley K. 2004. Under The Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea
and the Kim Dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.
Park, Kyung Ae. 1992. "Women and Revolution in North Korea." Pacific Affairs 65, no.
4: 527- 545.
Ravine, Robert. 2011. The People's Champion: A Practical Guide to Starting Your Own
Cult of Personality. Milwaukee, WI: Baskerville Press.
Robinson, Michael Edson. 1988. Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925.
Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Robinson, Michael F., and Michael E. Robinson. 1986. "Nationalism and the Korean
Tradition, 1896-1920: Iconoclasm, Reform, and National Identity." Korean
Studies 10, no. 1: 35-53.
Roh, Jeong-Ho. 2006. "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology
System." Contemporary Issues in Business Laws of South and North Korea.
Columbia Law. Website.
Ryang, Sonia. 2000. "Gender in Oblivion: Women in the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (North Korea)." Journal of Asian and African Studies 35, no. 3: 32349.
Schultz, Edward J. 2004."An Introduction to the Samguk Sagi." Korean Studies 28: 113.
Seth, Michael J. 2011. A History of Korea from Antiquity to the Present. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Suh, Dae-Sook. 1988. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
Suh, Jae-Jung, ed. 2013. Origins of North Korea's Juche. Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books.

78

alontai, al s. 2005. Kim Il Sung in the Krushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and
the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press.
Turku, Helga. 2009. Isolationist States in an Interdependent World. Farnham, England:
Ashgate.
Westad, Odd Arne. 1988. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance, 1945-1963. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP. Print.
Whiting, Charles. 1999. Battleground Korea: The British in Korea. Stroud: Sutton. Print.
Xu, Stella. 2016. Reconstructing Ancient Korean History: The Formation of Korean-Ness
in the Shadow of History. Lanham: Lexington Books.

79

Appendix
The Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Monolithic Ideology System were
officially announced by Kim Jong Il in 1974 (cited in Kim 2008 and Roh 2006).
1. We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with the
revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.
2.

We must honor the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung with all our loyalty.

3.

We must make absolute the authority of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung.

4.

We must make the Great eader comrade Kim Il ung’s revolutionary ideology
our faith and make his instructions our creed.

5.

We must adhere strictly to the principle of unconditional obedience in carrying
out the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung's instructions.

6.

We must strengthen the entire party's ideology and willpower and revolutionary
unity, centering on the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung.

7. We must learn from the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung and adopt the
communist look, revolutionary work methods and people-oriented work style.
8.

We must value the political life we were given by the Great Leader comrade
Kim Il Sung, and loyally repay his great political trust and thoughtfulness with
heightened political awareness and skill.

9. We must establish strong organizational regulations so that the entire party,
nation and military move as one under the one and only leadership of the Great
Leader comrade Kim Il Sung.
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10. We must pass down the great achievement of the revolution by the Great Leader
comrade Kim Il Sung from generation to generation, inheriting and completing it
to the end.
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